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SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
THE BURGER COURT:
A RETREAT IN PROGRESS?
Caren Dubnoff
INTRODUCTION
A decade has passed since the Supreme Court in Reed v.
Reed1 signaled a new sensitivity to the possibility that sex-
based government action constitutes invidious discrimination. This
departure from Warren Court doctrine was in the direction of in-
creased judicial scrutiny and was often used as evidence that the
Burger Court, although perceived as less activist and concerned for
individual rights than its predecessor, had actually expanded upon
these rights rather than abandoned them.2
It took five more years for the Court to acknowledge that it had
embarked on a new course. Two decisions issued in the mid-1970's,
Craig v. Boren3 and Califano v. Webster,4 led many observers to
conclude that sex was a disfavored classification, allowed only in
narrowly remedial contexts.5 At the same time, some commentators
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Chairperson of Department of Politi-
cal Science, College of the Holy Cross; B.A. 1964, Bryn Mawr; PhD. 1974, Columbia
University. The author wishes to thank Louis Scerra, Harvard Law School, 1983, for
his invaluable assistance in the research and preparation of sections of this article.
1. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, appellant challenged a provision requiring
automatic preference of men over women as estate administrators. The Court held
the statutory preference unconstitutional because it provided "dissimilar treatment
for men and women who are ... similarly situated." Id. at 77. See generally
Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doc-
trine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv. L. Rev.
1, 34 (1972).
2. See L. Goldstein, Sex and the Burger Court, in Race, Sex, and Policy Prob-
lems 105-08 (M. Palley & M. Preston eds. 1979).
3. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
4. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam). The Califano Court sustained a gender
based classification that used a more favorable formula in computing benefits for
women than for men. In applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court made an "'in-
quiry into the actual purposes"' of the discrimination. Id. at 317 (quoting Wein-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975)). In upholding the statute the Cali-
fano Court concluded that it "operated directly to compensate women for past
economic discrimination." 430 U.S. at 318.
5. E.g., Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market Hostility to
Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. Rev. 55, 80 (1979); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court,
the Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 Va.
L. Rev. 945, 994-98 (1975). See generally Ginsburg, Sexual Equality Under the
Fourteenth and Equal Rights Amendments, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 161, 162-72 [here-
inafter cited as Ginsburg I]; Comment, Equal Protection and Due Process: Contrast-
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criticized the Court for inadequate articulation and inconsistent ap-
plication of the principles that guided its new course.0 Although they
recognized a pattern in the Court's decisions requiring equal treat-
ment of men and women, the commentators feared that the standard
being applied was too indefinite. They argued that, absent a fixed rule
making sex a suspect classification, the newly won protections against
sex discrimination rested on a precarious balance. 7 Too much leeway
remained for the Justices to retreat in response to perceived shifts in
the political climate or to make erroneous judgments due to their own
unconsciously held biases." The Court's two most recent decisions,
Michael M. v. Superior Court9 and Rostker v. Goldberg,'0 indicate
that this fear was indeed prescient."
During the 1980 term, the Court issued three opinions involving
explicit gender-based laws. Sex distinctions were upheld in Michael
M. and Rostker and invalidated in Kirchberg v. Feenstra. 2 In Kirch-
berg, the Court determined that the equal protection clause did not
allow the state to give a husband the unilateral right to dispose of
jointly held property without his wife's consent.13 On the same day,
the Court decided Michael M. v. Superior Court,4 upholding a Cali-
fornia law that made it a crime for a male to engage in sexual
intercourse with a female under the age of 18 who is not his wife, but
did not make the female's participation criminal. The Court held that
the statute did not involve unconstitutional gender discrimination. 5
ing Methods of Review Under Fourteenth Amendment Doctrine, 14 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 529, 541-45 (1979).
6. Baer, Sexual Equality and the Burger Court, 31 W. Pol. Q. 470, 471-72
(1978); Ginsburg I, supra note 5, at 171.
7. Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution-The State of the Art, 4
Women's Rts. L. Rep. 143, 147-49 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ginsburg II]; Com-
ment, Sexual Equality: Not for Women Only, 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 427, 460 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Sexual Equality]; see Ginsburg I, supra note 5, at 170-71.
8. See Gertner, Bakke on Affirmative Action for Women: Pedestal or Cage?, 14
Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 173, 179-88 (1979) (focusing on the problem of distinguish-
ing among types of gender classification).
9. 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981).
10. 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
11. Since its decision in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Court had
repeatedly reaffirmed its position that gender based legislation must be tested by a
stringent standard. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150
(1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 84, 89 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,
278-83 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (per curiam).
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 204-07 (1977); cf. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v.
Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) (explicit gender classification requires "exceedingly
persuasive justification"). The Court's recent decisions in Michael M. and Goldberg
are thus all the more alarming.
12. 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981).
13. Id. at 1198-99.
14. 101 S. Ct. 1200 (1981).
15. Id. at 1207-08.
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In Rostker v. Goldberg,1 6 the Court validated the Military Selective
Service Act, which authorized a presidential proclamation requiring
men, but not women, between the ages of 18 and 26 to register for the
draft.17
It is not immediately evident that the Court has veered from prece-
dential principles this term because gender classifications are assessed
under a standard that is by its very nature indefinite., Ostensibly,
the Court subjects gender classifications to an intermediate level of
review.' 9 According to this standard, the government must demon-
strate an important interest and a substantial relationship of the classi-
fication to that interest. 20 Intermediate scrutiny leaves open the ques-
tion of how important the interest or how accurate the fit must be
between the interest and the classification.2 ' Although intermediate
scrutiny has been regularly invoked in gender classification cases since
1976,22 the standard has been applied differently when women were
harmed23 and when they were benefited. 4
This bifurcated approach conforms to a respected conception of
equal protection. 25 In Michael M., however, the Court assessed the
impact of the law in such a way as to raise questions about the Court's
ability to judge the burden placed on women. Because a correct
evaluation of burden is critical to an effective constitutional analysis,
the Court's failure to make such an evaluation threatens the very core
of the newly acquired protection afforded women by the equal pro-
tection clause. Beyond that, the reliance on the "real difference"
16. 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
17. Id. at 2660.
18. This vagueness in the Court's standard for gender classification has resulted
in confusion in the lower courts. Compare Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602,
608-09 (1st Cir. 1977) (intermediate scrutiny applied to hold statutory rape law
unconstitutional), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978) with Rundlett v. Oliver, 607
F.2d 495, 502 (1st Cir. 1979) (intermediate scrutiny applied to hold similar statutory
rape law constitutional).
19. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
20. Id.
21. Ginsburg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 Tul. L. Rev. 451, 462 (1978)
(Court has difficulty applying consistent standard) [hereinafter cited as Ginsburg
III]; see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (criticiz-
ing intermediate standard as "so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judi-
cial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types of legislation").
22. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
23. See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 101 S. Ct. 1195, 1198 (1981); Califano v.
Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 84-86 (1979).
24. See, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388-89 (1979); Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353-57 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1979).
25. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362-66 (1978) (Brennan,
J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1974); B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law
§§ 9.6-.8, at 375-79 (2d ed. 1979); Gertner, supra note 8, at 179-88.
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rationale reflected in Michael M. in the opinions of Justices
Rehnquist2 16 and Stewart2 7 produces a disquieting echo of pre-1971
gender classification cases.28 Justice Rehnquist's acceptance of a state
interest in protecting women2 9 adds another troubling element.
The concern increases when Michael M. is read in conjunction with
Rostker. In Rostker, for the first time in a decade, the Court approved
a gender-based classification without determining that it did not dis-
advantage women.3 0 The "real difference" rationale as a defense for
sex-based action was reaffirmed and expanded.3 1 In allowing a dis-
advantageous classification to stand, the Rostker Court re-opened the
possibility that conscious discrimination will be approved whenever
linked to differences between males and females that a majority of
Justices consider valid.
Michael M. is an attempt at consistency. Rostker presents the more
drastic break with the cases of the preceding decade. Taken together,
Rostker and Michael M. indicate either an inadequate understanding
of what constitutes sex discrimination or a tacit retreat from the
protection recently afforded women by the Court's interpretation of
the equal protection clause. These two cases leave sex discrimination
law in a state of confusion-a confusion which is not lessened by
Kirchberg. The latter decision, however, does provide some comfort
that a return to total judicial abdication is not in the making.
This Article demonstrates that Michael M. and Rostker are flawed
decisions that are largely the product of stereotypical thinking about
women. In both cases, the Court affirmed a limitation on women's
right to assume responsibility in society and in so doing hindered their
achievement of equal citizenship. These opinions are inconsistent with
precedent and with the goals of equal protection.
Part I evaluates the facts and reasoning of Michael M. in light of the
precedent in this area and examines the basis for distinguishing be-
tween classifications that harm women and those that do not. Part II
provides an examination of the decision in Rostker. The analysis
focuses on the Court's treatment of government policies and laws that
expressly distinguish between males and females.
In Part III, the implications of these cases and Kirchberg are exam-
ined. The cases can and should be narrowly read, and there is hope in
26. 101 S. Ct. 1200, 1205 (1981) ("young men and young women are not simi-
larly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse").
27. Id. at 1209 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("there are differences between males
and females that the Constitution necessarily recognizes").
28. See infra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
29. 101 S. Ct. at 1206 ("It is hardly unreasonable for a [state] legislature. . . to
protect minor females .... ").
30. 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2655-59 (1981).
31. Id. at 2658 ("Men and women, because of the combat restrictions on women,
are simply not similarly situated .... ").
372 [Vol. 50
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both the language of these cases and in the general attitudes of the
Justices manifest in case precedent that they will be. Finally, this
Article suggests a set of principles that could provide for both equality
and consistency. Strict scrutiny should govern when the burden of the
statute falls on women. Intermediate scrutiny should be applied to
legislation that prefers women and a rational relationship standard
should be applied to legislation with a neutral impact.
I. AN EVALUATION OF BURDEN IN GF.NDER-BAsED
STATUTES: Michael M. RECONSIDERED
Historically, the constitutional validity of sex-based classifications
was never seriously doubted by the Court.32 In the early years after
the passage of the fourteenth amendment, such classifications were
not only accepted, 33 they were endorsed.34 For example, in 1872, in
Bradwell v. State,35 the Supreme Court validated an Illinois law that
prevented married women from practicing law. The holding was
accompanied by a strong statement approving such differential treat-
ment. 36 The view that women were weaker than men was behind
many of the Court's decisions, especially those validating regulations
that controlled women in business.37
32. Ginsburg III, supra note 21, at 451 (Court's willingness to overturn gender-
based classifications is a very recent development).
33. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 59-63 (1961) (Court upheld statute
exempting women from jury duty, deferring to state's desire to relieve women from
this duty); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 465-67 (1948) (Court upheld statute
forbidding women to work as bartenders unless related to bar owner, accepting
state's rationale that statute protects women from moral and social hazards), over-
ruled, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 (1976); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21
Wall.) 162, 177-78 (1874) (Court upheld a statute granting only men the right to
vote, accepting argument that neither the Constitution, nor the fourteenth amend-
ment, made all citizens voters).
34. The position of women in this country at its inception is reflected in the view
expressed by Thomas Jefferson that women should be neither seen nor heard in
society's decision-making councils. See M. Gruberg, Women in American Politics 4
(1968).
35. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
36. Justice Bradley wrote, "Man is, or should be, woman's protector and de-
fender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the
nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the
domain and functions of womanhood. The harmony, not to say identit'y, of interests
and views which belong, or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to
the idea of a woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband .... The paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator." 83 U.S. at
141.
37. See, e.g., Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294-95 (1924) (statute restrict-
ing the working hours of women in city restaurants upheld); Bosley v. McLaughlin,
1981] 373
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Until 1971, all gender-based government action, with one excep-
tion, 38 was upheld under the rational relationship standard. 9  The
turning point was Reed v. Reed.40  While purporting to apply the
traditional rationality test, the Court actually subjected the statute to
stricter scrutiny. 41 In Reed, an Idaho state law required that men be
preferred over women in the selection of estate administrators. The
state argued that the classification limited the workload of the probate
courts and was based on the assumption that "in general men are
better qualified to act as an administrator than are women." 42 Under
the rational relationship standard, almost any plausible justification
suffices to validate a statute.43 Yet, the Supreme Court invalidated
236 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1915) (statute setting maximum hours for female hospital
employees upheld); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373, 377-78 (1915) (statute establish-
ing maximum hours for women working in hotels upheld); Riley v. Massachusetts,
232 U.S. 671, 680-81 (1914) (statute establishing maximum hours for female factory
workers upheld); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908) (statute establishing
maximum hours for female laundry workers upheld). In Muller, the Court stated,
"[t]hat woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place
her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious .... Differentiated by
these matters from the other sex, she is properly placed in a class by herself, and
legislation designed for her protection may be sustained, even when like legislation is
not necessary for men and could not be sustained." Id. at 421-22, See generally J.
Baer, The Chains of Protection: The Judicial Response to Women's Labor Legislation
29-39 (1978) (history of economic legislation protecting women); Ginsburg, Some
Thoughts on Benign Classifications in the Context of Sex, 10 Conn. L. Rev. 813,
814-15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Ginsburg IV] (historical tendency of legislators to
regard all gender based legislation as designed to benefit or protect women).
38. Adkins v, Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating a law fixing
minimum wages for women and children), overruled, West Coast Hotel Co. v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
39. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-24, at 1060-62 (1978); Rawalt,
Equal Justice for Women-Update the Constitution, 17 N.Y.L.F. 528, 532 (1971).
The rational basis standard provides that if a classification is rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective, it will survive judicial scrutiny. See, e.g., United
States v. Reiser, 532 F.2d 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976); United
States v. Fallon, 407 F.2d 621, 623 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969);
United States v. Cook, 311 F. Supp. 618, 621-22 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
40. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
41. Id. at 74-76. The Court said that a classification "must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation." Id. at 76 (quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)); see Ginsburg III, supra note 21, at 468-70;
Gunther, supra note 1, at 33-34.
42. 465 P.2d 635, 638 (Idaho 1970), rev'd and remanded, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
43. Once the Court accepts the applicability of the rational relationship test, it
makes little effort to challenge the rationality of the government action or to review
the aims of that action. The Court has even offered its own justifications in the
absence of an adequate government case. Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483,
490 (1955); G. Gunther, Individual Rights in Constitutional Law 255 (1976). See
generally New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979) (a comprehen-
sive discussion of the rational relationship standard and its connection to a potentially
unified theory of equal protection).
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the law on the grounds that the classification was impermissibly arbi-
trary even though the state's justification was arguably logical. 44 Had
the Supreme Court applied the traditional rationality test, it surely
would have upheld Idaho's law.
The rejection in Reed of the standard of minimum rationality did
not immediately lead to the adoption of a clear substitute. Heightened
scrutiny remained unacknowledged and undefined until Craig v.
Boren.45 In Craig, a majority of the Justices explicitly agreed that
gender invoked something more than mere rationality, yet something
less than strict scrutiny. 46  In the words of Justice Powell, "candor
compels the recognition that the relatively deferential 'rational basis'
standard of review normally applied takes on a sharper focus when we
address a gender-based classification." ' 47  Justice Brennan established
the requisite standard, stating that "[t]o withstand constitutional
challenge, . . . classifications [based on] gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achieve-
ment of those objectives." 48  This standard was a compromise, a
standard of scrutiny that fell between the exacting requirements of
suspect classification/strict scrutiny and the traditional, deferential
analysis of the rational basis test. Because this new standard was
44. 404 U.S. at 76.
45. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973),
sex was declared a suspect class by a plurality of four Justices, but no specific
standard for analysis was announced until Craig. The Frontiero plurality was never
able to marshal a majority of the court. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion, joined by
Justices Douglas, White and Marshall. Justice Stewart wrote a separate concurring
opinion, finding that the statutes constituted an "invidious discrimination." 411 U.S.
at 691 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Blackmun, also wrote a separate concurrence, finding it unnecessary to decide
whether sex was a suspect classification. 411 U.S. at 691-92 (Powell, J., concurring).
46. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). In Craig, the Court invalidated an Oklahoma
statute barring the sale of 3.2% beer to males, but not females, under the age of
twenty-one. The Craig majority indicated that this intermediate standard was
"establish[ed]" by "previous cases" such as Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 429
U.S. at 197-98; see Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Lombard, Sex: A Classifi-
cation in Search of Strict Scrutiny, 21 Wayne L.J. 1355, 1369-70 (1975). In Stanton
the Court found that gender-based classifications must have a "fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation." 421 U.S. at 14 (citations omitted). As in
Reed, the Court hinted at a standard stricter than mere rationality. The standard of
strict scrutiny is applied to statutes that infringe upon fundamental rights or classifi-
cations that are deemed suspect. To be sustained, legislation under this standard
must be based upon compelling governmental objectives and necessary to their
accomplishment. Tribe, supra note 39, § 16-6, at 1002. Suspect classifications include
race, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and national origin, Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Fundamental rights include the right to travel, Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the right to privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965), and the rights expressly guaranteed by the Constitution. The
strict scrutiny test has been described as "'strict' in theory and fatal in fact." Gun-
ther, supra note 1, at 8.
47. 429 U.S. at 210-11 (Powell, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 197.
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established in a case in which males were disadvantaged, the Craig
decision suggested that any gender-based classification-male or fe-
male-would be disfavored. 49
In the years between the decision in Reed and the 1980 Term, the
Court invalidated gender-based classifications on equal protection
grounds in more than a dozen cases.50 The Justices had almost all
given credence to the standard of intermediate scrutiny. 1 They re-
mained divided, however, over the actual requirements of that stand-
ard, and they applied the intermediate standard differently when
men were burdened than when women were burdened.5 2
Nonetheless, the Court has emphasized that gender-based distinc-
tions should not be part of the "baggage of sexual stereotypes,"' 5
packed with "archaic and overbroad generalizations" 54 that arise
from the "role-typing society has long imposed."5 5 The Court has
consistently refused to sustain legislation disfavoring women regard-
less of the accuracy of the generalizations advanced for its support.50
The Court's rationale in rejecting such justifications was that general-
izations may be accurate only because of a history of sex discrimina-
tion.57 Consequently, to uphold gender-based classifications because
of the validity of generalizations would be tantamount to perpetuat-
ing a disadvantage against women. For example, in overturning a
state law which allowed fathers to discontinue child support for fe-
49. L. Tribe, supra note 39, § 16-25, at 1065-66 (discussion of Craig opinion and
Court's skepticism of legislation based on sexual stereotypes).
50. E.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151-52 (1980);
Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 89 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979);
see cases cited infra note 299. The Court also invalidated gender classifications in two
cases based on due process claims. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 370 (1979);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
51. In Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977), Justices White, Marshall and
Powell joined the Brennan opinion. Justice Stevens did not dispute the standard but
stressed that it should be applicable regardless of which sex is disadvantaged. Id. at
218-19 (Stevens, J., concurring). In Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S.
142 (1980), Justice White reiterated the validity of the intermediate standard, id. at
150, and only Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 153-54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
see infra notes 299-309 and accompanying text.
52. See infra pt. I(D).
53. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979).
54. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
55. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 15 (1975).
56. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975); Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 14 (1975). "Sex-based classifications are in many settings invidious because
they relegate a person to the place set aside for the group on the basis of an attribute
that the person cannot change. Such laws cannot be defended. . . on the ground that
the generalizations they reflect may be true of the majority of members of the class,
for a gender-based classification need not ring false to work a discrimination that in
the individual case might be invidious." Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398
(1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
57. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975).
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male offspring at a younger age than for male offspring, the Court
accepted that men have traditionally required a higher level of educa-
tion than women in order to be able to support their familiess8
Nevertheless, "[t]o distinguish between the two on educational
grounds is to be self-serving: If the female is not to be supported so
long as the male, she hardly can be expected to attend school as long
as he does, and bringing her education to an end earlier coincides with
the role-typing society has long imposed." '59
Generalizations about the economic dependency of women provide
another example. The Court has acknowledged that there is empirical
support for the generalization that wives are more likely to be depen-
dent on their husbands, than husbands are on their wives.,* While
the situation of women is changing, these generalizations are still
largely true. Although forty-nine percent of the women who have
children under the age of eighteen work outside of the home,0 ' there
remains significant dependency as a result of lower paying employ-
ment opportunities.62  Thus, it is arguably rational for the govern-
ment to allocate employment benefits according to assumptions of
female dependency to accomodate administrative convenience. 3
Nonetheless, these classifications penalize female workers whose fami-
lies receive less than those of similarly situated male workers, and the
Court has consistently disallowed administrative convenience as a
rationale to justify such distinctions. 64
A. Michael M. v. Superior Court
In Michael M., the Court broke with tradition and upheld a statute
based primarily on generalizations about women. The Court recog-
nized and reiterated that " 'a State is not free to make overbroad
generalizations based on sex which are entirely unrelated to any dif-
ferences between men and women or which demean the ability or
58. Id. at 10.
59. Id. at 15.
60. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 205-07 (1977).
61. Frug, supra note 5, at 55 n.8.
62. Id. at 55 n.2 (in 1973, women's median earnings were 57% of men's median
earnings); Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Employment and Earn-
ings 63-65 (October 1981) (in 1981, women's median earnings were 64% of men's
median earnings).
63. Administrative convenience is not an unimportant goal, but after Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), it was no longer considered a sufficient justification for
gender-based classifications. "[A]ny statutory scheme which draws a sharp line be-
tween the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience,
necessarily commands 'dissimilar treatment for men and women who are... simi-
larly situated."' Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973) (emphasis in
original) (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971)); see Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977).
64. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971).
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social status of the protected class.' "65 Further, the Court acknowl-
edged that "[g]ender-based classifications may not be based upon
administrative convenience, or upon archaic assumptions about the
proper roles of the sexes." '6'  Nevertheless, the Court upheld as consti-
tutional a California statutory rape law 7 that subjected only males to
criminal prosecution, even though the statute reinforced paternalistic
attitudes towards women68 and was justified by arguments of admin-
istrative convenience. 9
The starting point of the Court's analysis was a determination of
the standard of review for evaluating the sex-based distinction. 70 Al-
though it is now generally accepted that a standard of intermediate
scrutiny applies in cases of sex differentiation, 71 there are in fact two
different formulations of this test. One formulation lies close to strict
scrutiny while the other is akin to the rational basis test.
As formulated by Justice Brennan, the intermediate standard re-
quires the government to demonstrate not only an important interest,
but also that the relationship of the classification to the interest is
substantial. 72  As refined by Justice Stewart, the test is much more
lenient. 73 Stewart would apply the Brennan test in situations where
the classification demeans "the ability or social status of the affected
65. Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 101 S. Ct. 1200, 1209 (1981) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (quoting Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 3,47, 354 (1979)).
66. 101 S. Ct. at 1209 (Stewart, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
67. Id. at 1207. "The crime of statutory rape has traditionally been understood as
consensual intercourse with a female under a particular age." Comment, The Consti-
tutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 757, 757 (1980) (footnote
omitted) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Rape Laws].
68. 101 S. Ct. at 1217-18 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Statutory Rape Laws,
supra note 67, at 766-70 "[S]tatutory rape laws invoke the benevolent parens patriae
power of the state to 'protect' young females and punish male ravishers. These
protective measures reflect sex-role stereotypes that are unfavorable to both males
and females." Id. at 766-67 (footnotes omitted).
69. See 101 S. Ct. at 1206-07. The majority accepted the state's argument that a
gender-neutral statute would frustrate effective enforcement because a female sub-
ject to criminal sanction would never report the incident. As the dissent points out,
thirty-seven states now have gender-neutral statutory rape statutes and no evidence
established that the law enforcement efforts of those states have been handicapped.
Additionally, California currently has gender-neutral statutes regulating other sexual
behavior and the state did not establish that it had any problem with their enforce-
ment. Id. at 1216 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also 59 Wash. U. L.Q. 310, 311 nn. 9
& 10 (1981) (lists the 39 jurisdictions with gender-neutral statutory rape provisions
and the 17 that retain gender-based statutes).
70. 101 S. Ct. at 1200, 1203-04.
71. See supra notes 46-55 and accompanying text.
72. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
73. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979) (The legislature may not "make
overbroad generalizations based on sex which are entirely unrelated to any differ-
ences between men and women or which demean the ability or social status of the
affected class.").
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class."' 74 When no such burden is imposed, under Stewart's test, the
classification is sustained as long as it is not "entirely unrelated to any
differences between men and women,"' 7 5 provided that the classifica-
tion is rational. Unlike the Brennan formulation, which applies when-
ever a semi-suspect classification is employed, the Stewart analysis
raises two questions. First, is the use of the classification burdensome?
Second, is there any basis for the classification? The assessment of
impact is therefore critical. If the classification is deemed burden-
some, the requirements of the Brennan formulation apply. If, on the
other hand, the classification is seen as benign, the less stringent
rationality test is sufficient. This test differs from the traditional ra-
tionality test in that it requires an inquiry into the effect of the
classification before determining that a reasonable basis defense is
acceptable.
Justice Rehnquist adopted the Stewart approach as the appropriate
basis for analysis in Michael M. ,76 thereby requiring a preliminary
judgment concerning the invidiousness of the classification. In Justice
Rehnquist's view, the criminal liability imposed solely on males did
not harm women. Essentially he reasoned that the classification
was nondiscriminatory because it merely equalized the position of
males and females. 78 Without the statute, only females would bear
the cost of intercourse through pregnancy. By imposing a criminal
penalty on males, the statute made both sexes responsible for the
consequences of their behavior. Justice Rehnquist posited that the law
was not based on stereotypical thinking about sex roles and behavior,
but instead on the objective fact that only females are capable of
becoming pregnant. 9 Moreover, it did not " 'demean the ability or
social status of the affected class,' "80-that is, males. Therefore, once
the Court concluded that there was no malign classification, only the
most limited scrutiny was required under the Stewart test. 8'
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. 101 S. Ct. at 1204.
77. Id. at 1205-07.
78. Id. at 1206.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1204 (quoting Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354 (1979)). Justice
Rehnquist argued that "the statute does not rest on the assumption that males are
generally the aggressors. It is instead an attempt by a legislature to prevent illegiti-
mate teenage pregnancy by providing an additional deterrent for men." Id. at 1207.
Justice Stevens rejected this analysis on the grounds that applying the statute only to
the male "may reflect a legislative judgment that in the typical case the male is
actually the more guilty party .... [T]he possibility that such an habitual attitude
may reflect nothing more than an irrational prejudice makes it an insufficient justifi-
cation for discriminatory treatment that is otherwise blatantly unfair." Id. at 1220
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1204. A number of lower courts have refused to apply Justice Brennan's
intermediate scrutiny test, reasoning that there is no gender-based discrimination in
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Justice Rehnquist then turned to a means/end inquiry. He recog-
nized that the legislature sought to discourage sexual intercourse by
enacting the statute but acknowledged that "[p]recisely why the legis-
lature desired that result is . . . somewhat less clear."'82  He then
articulated why "the individual legislators may have voted for the
statute"8 3 and declared that at least one of the reasons was to prevent
illegitimate teenage pregnancies. 84 Justice Rehnquist thus did two
things contrary to Supreme Court precedent: He deferred to the state
court's assessment of the legislative goal, which in turn rested on the
untested assertions of the state prosecutor; and he essentially supplied
the state's statutory justification by constructing the arguments to
support the gender-based classification.8 5
While the Supreme Court accords deference to state court find-
ings,86 the Court must undertake an independent inquiry into statu-
tory purposes when constitutional rights are implicated.8, Moreover,
the Court has established that it will not infer a legislative purpose sua
sponte to sustain gender-based classifications. 88  "The burden ...is
on those defending the discrimination to make out the claimed justifi-
cation ... "89 In Kirchberg v. Feenstra,1' the Court's most recent
statement regarding the requisite burden of proof, Justice Marshall
wrote that the Court would not speculate about the existence of
justification for the gender-based statute at issue. Yet, Justice Rehn-
quist in Michael M. did not conduct an independent inquiry into the
legislative history or require the state to support the legislative goal by
a showing of empirical evidence.
In fact, the history of the statutory rape law in California suggests
that pregnancy prevention was not among the state's goals in enacting
the statute. 91 Furthermore, the state's assertion that the statute's
legislation based on the unique physical characteristics of one sex. See, e.g., Hall v.
McKenzie, 537 F.2d 1232, 1235 (4th Cir. 1976); People v. Salinas, 191 Colo. 171,
174, 551 P.2d 703, 706 (1976); State v. Wilson, 296 N.C. 298, 312-13, 250 S.E.2d
621, 630 (1979). Justice Rehnquist made essentially the same argument in justifying a
lesser standard of review. 101 S. Ct. at 1204-05.
82. Id. at 1204.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1204-05.
85. Id. at 1204-07.
86. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1967).
87. Id. at 373 (citations omitted); see Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153, 155-56
(1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 (1961); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 366 (1886).
88. See Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 101 S. Ct. 1195, 1199 (1981) (state must advance
"'exceedingly persuasive justification"' for challenged classification) (quoting Person-
nel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979)).
89. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980).
90. 101 S. Ct. 1195, 1198 n.7 (1981).
91. In People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361
(1964) (en banc), the California Supreme Court indicated that the purpose of the
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purpose and effect was to curtail teenage pregnancies was unsup-
ported. The only data presented were statistics confirming the in-
creasing problem of teenage pregnancy.92  Because the statute has
long been in existence, and yet teenage pregnancy has increased, one
might wonder why the Court still believed that the criminal penalty
would deter anyone's behavior. As Justice Stevens said,
[l]ocal custom and belief-rather than statutory laws of venerable
but doubtful ancestry-will determine the volume of sexual activ-
ity among unmarried teenagers. The empirical evidence cited by
the plurality demonstrates the futility of the notion that a statutory
prohibition will significantly affect the volume of that activity or
provide a meaningful solution to the problems created by it.9 3
There is considerable doubt then as to whether the law had the
constitutionally requisite substantial effect on the stated problem,
however important that objective may have been.
As Justice Rehnquist analyzed the situation, illegitimate pregnan-
cies would be reduced if sexual intercourse is statutorily inhibited. 4
The higher the costs of sexual intercourse, the less likely that it would
occur. Justice Rehnquist posited that there is a natural cost already
imposed on women, because only women can become pregnant.
There is no such natural sanction for males, s but fear of a criminal
statutory rape law is to prevent an "unwise disposition" of an underage female's
sexual favors. Id. at 531, 393 P.2d at 674, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 362. In People v. Mackey,
46 Cal. App. 3d 755, 120 Cal. Rptr. 157, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 951 (1975), the court
defended the statutes sexual distinction by asserting that young girls are more likely
than young boys to be "the objects of the desires and designs of older people of the
opposite sex who are on the prowl." 46 Cal. App. 3d at 760, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 160. In
People v. Verdegreen, 106 Cal. 211, 39 P. 607 (1895), the court found that -[t]he
obvious purpose of [the statute] is the protection of society by protecting from
violation the virtue of young and unsophisticated girls." 109 Cal. at 214, 39 P. at 608.
92. 101 S. Ct. at 1205 n.3.
93. Id. at 1218 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
94. 101 S. Ct. at 1205-06. This position seems inconsistent with the Court's
recent holding that unmarried minors have a constitutional right to obtain contra-
ceptives. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686-91 (1977). Yet, gender-
based statutory rape statutes have frequently been sustained on the theory that they
prevent teenage pregnancy. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 122 Ariz. 445, 447, 595 P.2d
990, 992 (1979) (en banc); Acosta v. State, 417 A.2d 373, 375-76 (Del. 1980). But see
Navedo v. Preisser, 630 F.2d 636, 638, 640-41 (8th Cir. 1980) (preventing pregnancy
not proven to be an actual purpose of Iowa statute and if it were, there would still be a
suspect classification); Meloon v. Helgemoe, 564 F.2d 602, 607 (1st Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 950 (1978) (same reasoning applied to New Hampshire statute).
95. Justice Rehnquist assumes that all the consequences of pregnancy fall on the
female. This is not true; the father of an illegitimate child may be subject to bastardy
proceedings by the mother to compel financial support. 10 Am. Jur. 2d Bastards § 74
(1963 & Supp. 1981). But see Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 11. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849,
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964) (child has no cause of action against father for
causing him to be born a bastard). Additionally, the father may suffer the same
emotional traumas faced by the young mother.
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penalty would provide the missing deterrent. Justice Rehnquist fur-
ther posited that the gender-specific provision provides a better deter-
rent than would a gender-neutral statute. A gender-neutral approach
would impair enforcement of the statute by deterring report of the
offense, because the accusing party would also be subject to the
penalty.96
Finally, Justice Rehnquist dismissed the argument advanced by the
petitioner that the statute was overbroad because it made unlawful
intercourse with very young females, some of whom do not have the
potential to become pregnant.9 7 Justice Rehnquist said that "it is
ludicrous to suggest that the Constitution requires the California Leg-
islature to limit the scope of its rape statute to older teenagers and
exclude young girls."'9 8 The statute is facially overbroad, however, if
its avowed purpose is to prevent teenage pregnancies. Justice
Rehnquist argued away this inconsistency by alleging that the protec-
tion of young females from physical injury due to sexual intercourse is
also a justifiable statutory purpose.9
In this last argument, Justice Rehnquist suggests that the protection
of females is an appropriate goal for the state. 100 This characteriza-
tion of the female, however, as a victim in need of protection from the
male aggressor serves to perpetuate sexual stereotyping and does a
disservice to both sexes.101 The Supreme Court has recently invali-
dated legislation that embodied other aspects of sex-role stereotyp-
ing, 02 and should not now regress into justifying legislation that
reflects such a double standard.
Justice Rehnquist's analysis is in sharp contrast to a true intermedi-
ate scrutiny analysis. Under Justice Brennan's test, the burden is on
the government to prove both the importance of its asserted objective
and the substantial relationship between the classification and the
objective. 103 In Michael M, the state was not required to offer any
evidence that the gender classification was effective in assisting en-
96. 101 S. Ct. at 1206-07; see Statutory Rape Laws, supra note 67, at 786; supra
note 69 and accompanying text.
97. 101 S. Ct. at 1207.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1204-07; accord United States v. Hicks, 625 F.2d 216, 218-20 (9th Cir.
1980), vacated and remanded, 101 S. Ct. 1752 (1981); Rundlett v. Oliver, 607 F.2d
495, 501-03 (1st Cir. 1979); Statutory Rape Laws, supra note 67, at 761; 59 Wash. U.
L.Q. 310, 312 (1981).
100. 101 S. Ct. at 1206-07. Justice Rehnquist explicitly states that "[i]t is hardly
unreasonable for a legislature ... to protect minor females." Id. at 1206.
101. Myers, Reasonable Mistake of Age: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64
Mich. L. Rev. 105, 124-25 (1965); Statutory Rape Laws, supra note 67, at 769-73.
102. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7,
14-15 (1975).
103. Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 151 (1980); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 388, 393 (1979).
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forcement.10 4  Moreover, analysis was confined to the question of
statutory enforcement, and no attempt was made to measure the
effects of the statute on deterring pregnancy.10 5 The discussion of the
availability of less drastic means for achieving this goal is sketchy. As
Justice Rehnquist correctly notes, there is no basis for judging whether
a statute that punishes all participants without regard to sex would be
more or less effective in discouraging the behavior. 00 He did not
mention that there are other, probably more effective, methods of
preventing pregnancy.107
The Court's argument was defective in a number of ways. First, the
application of minimum scrutiny to this gender classification under-
mines the Supreme Court's determination that sex is a disfavored
classification"' and ignores the judicial responsibility to apply impar-
tially the appropriate level of scrutiny to gender-based classifications.
The court also failed to comprehend the way in which the classifica-
tion reinforced stereotypical thinking about men and women. Finally,
and most seriously, the Court failed to recognize the burden that the
statute placed on women. The application of the Stewart standard in
Michael M. represents an error by the Court in assessing burden. The
underpinnings of the concept that such an assessment must be accu-
rately made before a standard of review can be applied are to be
found in both equal protection theory'09 and in recent precedent." 0
B. Equal Protection Theory and the Relevance of Burden
The equal protection clause is commonly defined as requiring like
treatment for those who are similarly situated."' It follows that the
104. 101 S. Ct. at 1215-17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 1214-17. "[T]he State must show that because its statutory rape law
punishes only males, and not females, it more effectively deters minor females from
having sexual intercourse." Id. at 1215 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
106. Id. at 1206.
107. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686-91 (1977) (Court
recognized minor's right of access to contraceptives); cf. Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976) (minors have right of access to abortions).
108. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971); supra notes 40-49 and accompa-
nying text.
109. See Wilkinson, supra note 5.
110. The Court has exhibited a wilingness to vary scrutiny depending on which
group is disadvantaged. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472-73 (1980) (race
considered in legislative districting); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 347-48 (1977) (race used in retroactive seniority program to
compensate for past discrimination); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ.,
402 U.S. 1, 22-29 (1971) (race a permissible factor in determining school composi-
tion).
111. "No State shall . .. deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; see Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of
the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341, 346 (1949).
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government is allowed to treat differently those who are differently
situated. 1 12 If persons are not similarly situated, then a law that treats
them in the same manner may actually result in unequal protection.
For example, the requirement that rich and poor alike pay a poll tax
in order to vote meant that many poor people could not vote, or had
to pay a relatively higher price for so doing. 1 3 As Professor Laurance
Tribe has written,
[f]irst, equality can be denied when government classifies so as to
distinguish, in its rules or programs, between persons who should
be regarded as similarly situated in terms of the relevant equal
protection principles....
Second, equality can be denied when government fails to clas-
sify, with the result that its rules or programs do not distinguish
between persons who, for equal protection purposes, should be
regarded as differently situated.114
Males and females are not always similarly situated. This is particu-
larly true with respect to past discrimination. Just as the "need for
effective social policies promoting racial justice in a society beset by
deep-rooted racial inequities" may necessitate race-specific action,"15
past discrimination against women may require present prefer-
ences."16
There are arguably several grounds for justifying a heightened
scrutiny for all gender classifications. 1 7 It is undisputed that women
constitute an identifiable group defined by "an immutable character-
istic determined solely by the accident of birth."" 8 They have been
subjected to discriminatory laws and social practices, some of which
continue and others of which persist in their effects. 10 Women are
obviously underrepresented in the decision-making bodies of govern-
ment. 20 In short, in terms of the factors Justice Stone identified in
112. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (quoting Tigner v. Texas, 310
U.S. 141, 147 (1940)); B. Schwartz, supra note 25, § 9.2, at 363-69.
113. See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-68 (1966).
114. L. Tribe, supra note 39, § 16-1, at 993 (emphasis in original).
115. United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 175 (1977) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring).
116. Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 318 (1977) (per curiam); see Schlesinger
v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975).
117. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A
Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 Yale L.J. 871, 875-86 (1971);
Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 Yale L.J. 920, 933
(1973); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitu-
tional Amendment?, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1499, 1507 (1971).
118. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973).
119. Id. at 684-88.
120. Id. at 686 n.17. In the 97th Congress, there are only two women in the
Senate and 10 women in the House of Representatives. Over the past 25 years, only
six women have served on the Cabinet. Only five percent of Federal judges are
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United States v. Carolene Products Company' -1 as increasing the
likelihood that government action would be based on prejudice,
women should qualify for special concern. Only their numbers set
them apart from other insular groups. 22
Establishing sex as a suspect classification, however, presents defi-
nite problems, 2 3 and there is justification for allowing some distinc-
tion between scrutiny of those classifications which harm women and
those which do not. Public choices that disadvantage males are not as
closely scrutinized under equal protection theory as those directed
against females. "Men as a general class have not been the victims of
the kind of historic, pervasive discrimination that has disadvantaged
other groups."' 2 4  In addition, as one commentator has observed,
"[w]hen the group that controls the decision making process classifies
so as to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for
being unusually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent
brand of review, are lacking." 125 Nonetheless, total abdication of
review is not warranted. There is an inherent unfairness in any distri-
bution of government benefits that is unrelated to individual responsi-
bility or choice, and thus the Stewart standard of review is unsatisfac-
tory. Further, there is always a risk that there will be social costs,
through the reinforcement of stereotypes or the perception of unfair-
ness, to a classification that gives women an advantage.
Several recent interpretations of the equal protection clause require
a structure that subjects classifications based on disfavored traits to
varying scrutinies depending on their purpose and effect. One com-
mentator126 suggested that "[t]he substantive core of the [fourteenth]
amendment, and of the equal protection clause in particular, is a
principle of equal citizenship, which presumptively guarantees to
each individual the right to be treated by the organized society as a
respected, responsible, and participating member."' 2 7  Heightened
judicial scrutiny is triggered by classifications that limit participation
women. Amicus Brief for the National Organization of Women, at 24, Rostker v.
Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981) [hereinafter cited as NOW Amicus Brief].
121. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (restrictions on the right to vote, restraints on
dissemination of information, interferences with political organizations, prohibition
of peaceful assembly); see Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 357 (1974) ("[G]ender-
based classifications too often have been inexcusably utilized to stereotype and stig-
matize politically powerless segments of society.") (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. See Getman, The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality,
1972 Sup. Ct. Rev. 157, 162-66.
123. See infra notes 318-19 and accompanying text.
124. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 n.1 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
125. Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 723, 735 (1974).
126. Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1977).
127. Id. at 4.
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in society, 12 or that stigmatize, because "each individual's basic hu-
manity is the primary value in the principle of equal citizenship." 2
In this analysis, heightened scrutiny is thus generated by circum-
stances quite similar to those under the antidiscrimination princi-
ple.130 Proceeding from the premise that the legal right guaranteed
by the equal protection clause is equal citizenship, the guarantee is not
at all incompatible with benign gender-conscious classifications. The
analysis continues:
[W]hen government acts to promote the equal citizenship values of
respect and participation, quite a different equal protection issue is
presented. Preferential minority admissions to state universities,
racial preferences in government hiring, racial preferences aimed
at integrating government housing projects-all these differ in the
most dramatic way from the purposeful infliction of stigmatic
harm.... These racial preferences are aimed at making us one
class of citizens by integrating various important phases of our
community life.'
Similarly, the legal right to "equal concern and respect from the
legislature," considered to be the core of the equal protection guaran-
tee by a second conmentator, 32 would also be compatible with be-
nign classifications. The clause does not require that the government
provide individuals with equal benefits. "Just because people are
handicapped, treating them as equals may require giving them a
larger share of the public wealth. At the very least, sympathy that
helps us understand the special circumstances of the handicapped is
not barred." 133
A quite different approach has been suggested by a third commen-
tator. 34 He would direct equal protection analysis away from the
claims of individuals and toward those of groups. To be avoided is
128. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(examples of such classifications).
129. Karst, supra note 126, at 8.
130. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 107
(1976); Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 111. Fiss uses the term "antidiscrimination
principle," Fiss, supra, at 117, to describe the structure formulated by Tussman &
tenBroek, originally called the "reasonable classification" principle. Tussman &
tenBroek, supra note 111, at 344. The antidiscrimination principle sees the equal
protection clause as prohibiting arbitrary distinctions, Fiss, supra, at 109, and identi-
fies certain characteristics likely to lead to such arbitrariness. Id. Fiss sees this
principle as inadequate for classifications that benefit minorities. Id. at 129. But see
Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
15-22 (1976) (all classifications that burden minorities are absolutely prohibited).
131. Karst, supra note 126, at 52-53 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
132. O'Fallon, Adjudication and Contested Concepts: The Case of Equal Protec-
tion, 54 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 19, 21 (1979).
133. Id. at 42.
134. Fiss, supra note 130.
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government action that harms social groups that are politically, eco-
nomically and socially disadvantaged. 35 This reformulation of the
constitutional principle mediating the equal protection clause is even
more supportive of race-conscious efforts to redress past discrimina-
tion. From this perspective, "[t]he appropriate standard for viewing a
policy that appears to the court to benefit a specially disadvantaged
group should be a rational-basis standard."' 3  Even the antidis-
crimination principle, properly viewed as a methodology for assuring
equal treatment, allows for some flexibility. "[W]here the objective
and immediate effect are to benefit minority persons, it seems inap-
propriate to subject the practice to the demanding criteria of the
suspect classification standard." 137
C. Guidelines for the Assessment of Burden
Line-drawing between burdensome and non-burdensome classifi-
cations is, of course, premised on the view that an assessment of
burden is possible. Such judgments are often easier in the abstract,
however, than in reality. Some manifestations of burden are obvious.
If sex-based action is undertaken with an intent to keep women in a
subservient position, it is clearly burdensome. One problem is that
invidious intent is rarely made manifest because few laws purport to
hurt women. They are instead defended as protective, compensatory,
or reflective of real differences between the sexes. 3 For example, the
denial of an economic benefit creates a burden. It is not always
135. Id. at 147-50.
136. Id. at 161.
137. Brest, supra note 130, at 19; see L. Tribe, supra note 39, § 16-1, at 993, §
16-6, at 1000-02. Some constitutional theorists have contended that preferential
policies can meet a strict scrutiny review. E.g., Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 Colum. L. Rev. 1023, 1045 (1979). Traditional
strict scrutiny, however, requires both a showing of a compelling state interest and a
showing that the proposed means are necessary to the achievement of that interest.
Although the elimination of social inequalities caused by discrimination might be
seen as compelling, it would be difficult to prove that a race-conscious program is
essential to achieving that goal. At the same time, there is nothing in preferential
treatment that inherently conflicts with the principle that Perry has identified as the
core value protected by the equal protection clause-the moral equality of the races.
"The question thus becomes: Does preferential treatment deny the principle of the
moral equality of the races; is it predicated on the view that those disadvantaged by
preferential treatment, white persons, are by virtue of race morally inferior to the
preferred nonwhites? The conspicuous answer to that question is 'No*." Id. at 1043.
Rather, Perry's concern is that preferential treatment may indirectly operate to
disadvantage nonwhites. The problems he notes are real and pertain equally to
gender classifications. For an extensive discussion of reverse discrimination, see
Henkin, DeFunis: An Introduction, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 483 (1975).
138. See Gertner, supra note 8, at 182; Ginsburg IV, supra note 37, at 814;
Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 675, 697 (1971); supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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obvious, however, that women have been placed at an economic
disadvantage, particularly if the denial occurs indirectly. In the early
years of this century, several state statutes were enacted which
set minimum working conditions for women. When such legislation
was directed at all workers, it was generally invalidated.139
When limited to women, such legislation withstood constitutional
challenge because the Court viewed women as weaker than men, with
a different role in society, and therefore the proper object of state
protection. 40 If the intent and effect of such legislation was that the
treatment accorded women in the marketplace improved conditions,
then the legislation could be seen as favorable. Intentions aside, how-
ever, it is now recognized that these restrictions were in fact burden-
some because they limited the opportunities available to women by
making competition with men more difficult.'14
Restriction of privileges, limitation of rights, or imposition of
harsher punishments for wrong-doing would surely be recognized as
burdensome. It is more difficult, however, to characterize the effect
of excusing a group from a responsibility. The disabling effects of such
a reduction in responsibility are not immediately clear. Many, if given
the option, would choose to avoid responsibility. For example, there
are many people who prefer not to serve on juries. One must ask,
however, whether the legislation that allowed women to avoid jury
duty was harmful to women or merely freed them to pursue other
goals. The Court invalidated this legislation on due process
grounds; 142 however, there may also have been equal protection diffi-
culties with the legislation.
As a general rule, actions that excuse a group from responsibility
should be considered burdensome. First, the special treatment is usu-
ally justified by reference to the special role or capabilities of the
group involved. For example, the exemptions from jury duty were
based on the special role of women as mothers. 43 This is the kind of
stereotype that is likely to perpetuate traditional thinking about
women and their capabilities, making entry into non-traditional roles
more difficult.
139. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Cotting v. Kansas City Stock
Yards Co., 183 U.S. 79 (1901).
140. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908); Bradwell v State, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872); J. Baer, supra note 37, at 15-29; Eastwood, The Double
Standard of Justice: Women's Rights under the Constitution, 5 Val. U. L. Rev. 281,
284-92 (1971); Ginsburg I, supra note 5, at 163.
141. Gertner, supra note 8, at 182-83; Ginsburg IV, supra note 37, at 827;
Johnston & Knapp, supra note 138, at 700.
142. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522
(1975).
143. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 369-70 (1979); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 534 n.15 (1975).
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Second, the avoidance of duty in one context legitimates differential
treatment in other areas. Duties and privileges are inextricably linked.
One commentator accurately described the issue as follows:
A citizen is a participant, a member of a moral community who
counts for something in the community's decision making proc-
esses. No less importantly, a citizen is a responsible member of the
society, one who owes obligations to his fellow members. Both
these values contribute to self-respect, but they also have indepen-
dent significance. 144
There is no dispute that classifications which stigmatize are harm-
ful, but there is considerable disagreement concerning the determina-
tion of when a stigma is present. If a classification labels a group as
inferior, the group is injured. If a classification perpetuates stereotypi-
cal thinking about a group's capabilities or its appropriate place in
society, it is harmful because it is likely to affect the opportunities of
the members of the group. It has been claimed that when any special
treatment for women is involved, the classification stigmatizes be-
cause it makes men think that women lack the capacity to succeed
without the preference.145 There are, however, classifications that do
not really seem to burden women. Some gender distinctions may be
neutral in their effects, such as the establishment of single-sex rest
rooms.1 46 Allowing women to buy alcoholic beverages at an earlier
age than men, the classification at issue in Craig v. Boren,' 47 was not
injurious to women, although it was constitutionally improper. The
difficulty is distinguishing between those classifications which type-
cast women and those which do not.' 48
It is possible to distinguish the injurious from the benign. Gender
classifications that place women at an economic disadvantage, that
are premised on stereotypical thinking about women's capabilities or
appropriate place in society, that force men to adhere to traditional
roles, or that restrict choice or responsibility should be adjudged
burdensome. In contrast, gender distinctions that compensate women
144. Karst, supra note 126, at 8.
145. Comment, Sexual Equality: Notfor Women Only, 29 Cath. U. L. Rev. 427,
443-44 (1980) ("[T]he use of the compensatory rationale in any form ultimately
reinforces traditional male-female role models .... ) [hereinafter cited as Not for
Women Only]; see Johnston, Sex Discrimination and the Supreme Court-1971-74,
49 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 617, 689-90 (1975); Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 100-01 (1975).
146. See Ginsburg, The Fear of the ERA, Wash. Post, Apr. 7, 1975, at A2, col. 3
(separate facilities for sleeping, dressing and bodily functions are protected by consti-
tutional privacy principles).
147. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). But see Ginsburg II, supra note 7, at 112-16. Even this
classification was not neutral for women because it reinforced the stereotype of "the
active boy, aggressive and assertive; the passive girl, docile and submissive." Id. at
144. It could also be argued that if any stereotype was perpetuated it was that
women are more responsible than men.
148. See Gertner, supra note 8, at 214.
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for either direct or societal discrimination, -that increase options al-
lowed women or that help women to overcome obstacles to achieve-
ment, and that have no demonstrable negative effect, may properly
be seen as benign. This is not to say that the line between classifica-
tions that are injurious and those that are not is always clear, but only
that a basis for judgment exists.
D. The Benign/Malign Distinction
There is considerable evidence that the Court in recent years has
struggled with the proposition that scrutiny should vary according to
the burdened group, and that it has implicitly accepted this con-
cept. 149 The existence of burden in sex-classification cases, however,
is not always readily apparent, nor is its relevance often understood.
Intermediate scrutiny was first announced in Craig v. Boren, a case in
which males were disadvantaged. 150 The Craig decision suggested
that any gender-based classification was to be disfavored. Following
Craig, intermediate scrutiny was applied in Califano v. Webster,'" a
case upholding a classification designed to compensate women for
past discrimination. This case raised the question of whether Kahn v.
Shevin152 and Schlesinger v. Ballard5 3 were still good law, because
they upheld laws benefiting women under a less exacting standard
than the intermediate scrutiny standard announced in Craig.54 Only
on closer inspection is it clear that a majority of Justices have applied a
lower level of scrutiny when the classification does not harm women.
The question remains whether the distinctions made by the Court
with respect to burden have been accurate.
1. Invalidation of Burdensome Classifications
The classifications invalidated in Reed v. Reed, 55 Frontiero v.
Richardson,5 6 Stanton v. Stanton, '. 7 Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 15 8
California v. Goldfarb,150 and the line of cases that have followed had
substantial costs for women. In Frontiero, the question presented was
149. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362-66 (1977)
(Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part); B. Schwartz, supra note 25, §§ 9.6-.8, at 375-79.
150. 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
151. 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (1977) (per curiam).
152. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
153. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
154. See L. Tribe, supra note 39, § 16-26, at 1068-70; Gertner, supra note 8, at
212-14, Ginsburg IV, supra note 37, at 822-24.
155. 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
156. 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973).
157. 421 U.S. 7, 17 (1975).
158. 420 U.S. 636, 648-53 (1975).
159. 430 U.S. 199, 204 (1977).
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whether the government could automatically provide dependency
allowances to the spouse of a male member of the armed services
regardless of whether she was actually dependent, but require the
husband of a female member of the military to demonstrate depen-
dency. Women were blatantly disadvantaged because they received
fewer fringe benefits than men similarly situated and were subtly
disadvantaged because of the paternalistic attitude the statute mani-
fested. 160
The statute at issue in Stanton designated different ages of majority
for males and females, twenty-one and eighteen respectively. 10  As a
result, appellee had terminated support of his daughter when she
attained the age of eighteen. The immediate injury caused to female
children was obvious-they did not receive the same level of support
as did male children, which in turn adversely affected their educa-
tional opportunities. The secondary effect of the statute was a perpet-
uation of the role-typing traditional in society.' 62
Both men and women were burdened by the statute challenged in
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld.163 It provided that the widows and minor
children of deceased workers receive payment based on the earnings
of the deceased husband and father but provided no payment to the
husbands of deceased women workers.' t 4 Three identifiable groups
could have been regarded as the object of discrimination: widowers,
the children of deceased female workers, and insured women whose
spouses received fewer benefits than the spouses of male workers. An
almost identical harm was created by the classification in Califano v.
Goldfarb .165 The Social Security Act granted survivors benefits to all
widows but only to those widowers who could demonstrate depen-
dency.1 6   Women workers thus received less protection for their
spouses than did male workers, even though the required contribu-
tions of both men and women were identical.
The penalty imposed on women was very similar in Calijano v.
Westcott16 7 and in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co.'1S In
Westcott, a unanimous court held that the Aid to Families With
Dependent Children Act violated the requirements of equal protec-
tion.'6 9 The Act granted benefits to children who had lost support
because of their father's unemployment, but denied benefits when the
160. 411 U.S. at 688.
161. 421 U.S. at 9.
162. Id. at 14-15.
163. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
164. Id. at 643-44.
165. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
166. Id. at 204.
167. 443 U.S. 76 (1979).
168. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
169. 443 U.S. at 80.
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loss of support was due to the mother's unemployment. In Wengler,
the Court used the same formulation to invalidate a Missouri law that
granted death benefits to widows without a proof of dependency, but
to widowers only upon such a demonstration. 70
In Orr v. Orr,17 1 the Court invalidated a law that required the
payment of alimony solely to females. The injury to women resulting
from this classification is not apparent unless one considers the likely
effect on the determination of roles within the family. A man is not
likely to agree to stay at home while his wife works if he knows that he
could be cut off from future support. Although the classification was
invalidated, it is unclear whether the Justices considered the distinc-
tion injurious to women.
Only one malign classification was not overturned by the Court. In
Vorcheimer v. School District of Philadelphia,72 the plaintiff chal-
lenged single-sex education. Two aspects of Philadelphia's practice of
segregating its academic high schools by sex seemed to require a
finding that women were injured. It was admitted that the girls'
school lacked equivalent facilities. 173 Furthermore, the segregation
was effectively compelled because the system provided no co-educa-
tional academic high schools, although there certainly were co-educa-
tional general high schools. ' 74 Nonetheless, the Philadelphia system
was upheld by the Third Circuit 175 and affirmed by an equally di-
vided Supreme Court. 76
2. Validations of Benign Classifications
In Kahn v. Shevin,17 7 the Court upheld a Florida law which
granted widows, but not widowers, a property tax exemption. 178
Many commentators have argued that the classification in Kahn was
not benign.17 9 Underlying much of the criticism directed at Kahn is
the view that all gender classifications perpetuate stereotypical think-
ing, thereby harming women. This view is hard to disprove. It is,
however, at least arguable that the classification in Kahn was not
170. 446 U.S. at 145-48.
171. 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
172. 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam).
173. 532 F.2d 880, 889 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), af'd by an
equally divided Court, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam).
174. Id.
175. 532 F.2d 880 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd, 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam).
176. 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (per curiam) (Justice Rehnquist did not participate in the
decision).
177. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
178. Id. at 352.
179. See Baer, supra note 6, at 480-84; Frug, supra note 5, at 76-81; Gertner,
supra note 8, at 184-88. But see Note, Single-sex Public Schools: The Last Bastion of
"Separate but Equal?", 1977 Duke L. Rev. 259, 262.
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injurious to women. 80 Furthermore, the generalization at issue here
was not one that would be likely to have a deleterious effect; it did not
type-cast women. Instead it asserted that women had a greater likeli-
hood of being economically disadvantaged as a result of spousal loss.
It is unlikely that such a statement would adversely affect role choice
between men and women.' 81
The Court upheld another benign classification in Schlesinger v.
Ballard.8 2 In that case, a federal statute required the discharge of
servicemen who had nine years of active service and were tvice
passed over for promotion. Servicewomen were allowed to remain in
the service for thirteen years, even when they were twice passed over
for promotion. The Court upheld the statute, calling it compensa-
tory.183 Justice Stewart posited that Congress "may... quite ration-
ally" have intended to compensate women for the demonstrable fact
that they were not accorded equal professional opportunities in the
Navy. 18 4 The classification compensated women for inequities in the
employment practices of the services and provided them with "the
same promotion and career tenure opportunities as male officers in
similar circumstances." 8 5
Although the classification in Ballard did not deny women an eco-
nomic benefit or restrict their activities, it has been argued that the
classification indirectly had that effect because it allowed the Armed
Forces to continue discriminatory recruitment and promotion poli-
cies. 8 6 This argument is mistaken; all compensatory schemes assume
a prior and continuing discrimination. The Navy's promotion prac-
tices were indeed discriminatory and should have been directly at-
tacked. In reality, however, they would not be overcome until suffi-
cient numbers of women were promoted to higher ranks or were
proven effective in roles currently dominated by males. Interim at-
tempts to achieve such a goal and to overcome the effects of such
practices, however, are distinct. They do not relieve the government
180. The financial impact of the statute in Kahn is not entirely dear. The statute
appears to involve an indirect cost to working married women who predecease their
spouses in that they would have to purchase more insurance to provide security for
their families than would similarly situated male workers who could count on their
spouses receiving the exemption. However, women workers made no direct contribu-
tion to the exemption provided by the statute. Likewise, the exemption could hardly
be seen as a direct fringe benefit of employment. In any event, the money was so
small that the injury to working women was minimal. 416 U.S. 351, 352-54 (1974).
181. See generally The Supreme Court, 1973 Term, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 41, 129-39
(1974) (analysis of the Court's decision in Kahn).
182. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
183. Id. at 508-09.
184. Id. at 508.
185. S. Rep. No. 676, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5, reprinted in 1967 U.S. Code Cong.
& Ad. News 1839, 1839.
186. Ginsburg IV, supra note 37, at 818.
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of the need to eliminate discriminatory practices but work toward
that end. The classification was thus correctly perceived as non-bur-
densome to women.
There is less controversy surrounding the designation of the classifi-
cation in Califano v. Webster 87 as benign. In this case, the Court
sustained a section of the Social Security Act that allowed women to
exclude three more earning years than men in computing their social
security benefit allotment on the grounds that the law was explicitly
intended to compensate women for the past discrimination they faced
in the job market.18  The Court cited the legislative history to indi-
cate that Congress' action was deliberate.1 89 The analysis here was
very different from that in Kahn and Schlesinger. Not only was actual
evidence of past discrimination required, but the Court seemed to rest
its decision on the fact that the statute was limited in duration and
carefully tailored to achieve its remedial purpose. 90
Benign gender-based classifications are also manifest in laws which
regulate the position of children born out of wedlock. The Supreme
Court has upheld a number of these laws. 1 1 Parham v. Hughes10 2
provides an example of a decision in which the Supreme Court ap-
proved a distinction which conferred a benefit on natural mothers.
The case involved a challenge by an unwed father to a statute that
denied him recovery for the wrongful death of his child, a child he
had acknowledged and had helped to support. On its face, the statute
also distinguished between married men and women by providing
that married fathers could sue for wrongful death of their children
only if their spouses were not living. Not only unmarried but also
married fathers were thus treated less favorably than unmarried
mothers.'93
In Justice Stewart's view, the statute presented no invidious dis-
crimination because the different treatment accorded men was ra-
tional. 94 First, paternity is difficult to establish, and second, unmar-
ried fathers have the option of legitimating their children.
187. 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam); see Gertner, supra note 8, at 187.
188. 430 U.S. at 314-17.
189. Id. at 318-21.
190. Id. at 320.
191. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (statute required court order of affiliation
before an illegitimate child could inherit intestate from its father but did not require
such an order regarding the mother); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1977)
(upheld law allowing adoption of an illegitimate child upon mother's consent alone
and did not give father veto power unless he had legitimated the child); Fiallo v.
Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977) (gender-based classification in immigration law regarding
illegitimates upheld).
192. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
193. Id. at 362 n.4 (White, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 357-58.
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Accordingly, men and women were not similarly situated with respect
to children born out of wedlock. 9 5
3. Benign Classifications Are Subjected to a Less
Exacting Standard of Review
It is clear that Justice Stewart's opinion for a closely divided Court
in Parham did not apply, the middle-tier analysis of intermediate
scrutiny. Instead he presented a reformulated standard in which a
classification that does not demean is to be upheld unless "entirely
unrelated" to real differences between the sexes. Citing Frontiero and
Craig, he wrote, "[ulnderlying these decisions is the principle that a
State is not free to make overbroad generalizations based on sex which
are entirely unrelated to any differences between men and women or
which demean the ability or social status of the affected class." 909 It
is obvious that entirely unrelated to real differences and substantially
unrelated to an important state interest'9 7 are not equivalent tests.
Moreover, the language of the Stewart standard is not the only aspect
of Justice Stewart's analysis that suggests less conqern when men are
the disfavored group. His willingness in Parham to confine the exami-
nation to only one aspect of the discrimination-that which allowed
suit for wrongful death by unmarried fathers who had legitimated
their children, but not by those unmarried fathers who had not-also
allowed for a lower standard of scrutiny.' 8 He ignored the argument
that the Georgia statute was overbroad in that it precluded even
married fathers from recovering damages if the mother were alive.' 9
By framing the questions as he did, Justice Stewart effectively dis-
missed the sex discrimination in requiring fathers but not mothers to
legitimate their children in order to sue for the child's wrongful
death.200
Having thus narrowed the issue, the Stewart opinion distinguished
the situation presented in Parham from those in earlier decisions that
had invalidated gender classifications, on the grounds that Georgia
granted fathers the opportunity to legitimate their children and thus
to eliminate the imposed burden.20' This, then, was not a situation in
which an individual was penalized for a characteristic over which he
had no control. Furthermore, the statute did not stigmatize fathers;
the classification reflected the reality that natural mothers are easier
195. Id. at 354-56.
196. Id. at 354 (emphasis added).
197. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
198. 441 U.S. at 356.
199. Id. at 362 n.4 (White, J., dissenting).
200. Id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting). But see id. at 355 n.6 (the constitutionality
of the legitimation statute was not at issue in this case).
201. Id. at 353.
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to identify than natural fathers.202 Justice Stewart found that the
state's position was further supported by the real differences reflected
in the positions of males and females under the statute, in that only
fathers could legitimate their children. 0 3 Justice Stewart's assess-
ment, therefore, did not turn on the degree of deprivation imposed on
the allegedly disadvantaged group. He did not conduct a burden
analysis because he found that the burden could be eliminated. The
use of Justice Stewart's standard of analysis is consequently inappro-
priate in cases where the discrimination is genuinely gender-based.
"Gender, like race, is a highly visible and immutable characteristic
that has historically been the touchstone for pervasive but often subtle
discrimination."2 0 4 There is nothing that an individual can do or
change to bring himself within the scope of a gender-based statute.
E. Michael M.: A Further Assessment
The use of a different analysis for classifications that are disadvan-
tageous to women from that used for classifications which are not is
consistent with the principles underlying the equal protection clause
as long as the determination of burden is accurately made.20 5 The
minimal scrutiny of the rational relationship test is not appropriate,
however, unless the classification has no harmful effects on either
males or females. The foregoing discussion suggests, then, that one
problem with Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Michael M. was his
virtual abdication of review once he established that the classification
did not burden women. A second and far more serious difficulty was
Rehnquist's failure to recognize that the classification in fact de-
meaned women.200  Justice Rehnquist apparently considered the
question of harm to women trivial. He directed his analysis of burden
to whether the classification was either demeaning to or placed an
unfair burden on men and dismissed without explanation the possibil-
ity that women were harmed. "In upholding the California statute we
also recognize that this is not a case where a statute is being chal-
lenged on the grounds that it 'invidiously discriminates' against fe-
males. To the contrary, the statute places a burden on males which is
not shared by females. 20 7
That males are burdened does not, however, foreclose the possibil-
ity that females might also be harmed; nor does it mean that a law is
gender neutral if both groups are harmed. The statutory provision at
issue in Michael M. provides a perfect example of these points. There
202. Id. at 355 n.7.
203. Id.
204. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
205. Baer, supra note 6, at 489-91.
206. See infra notes 215-18 and accompanying text.
207. Michael M. v. Super. Ct., 101 S. Ct. 1200, 1207 (1981).
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is no dispute that the statute places a burden on males. The contention
that the classification is not demeaning to males is less certain and
turns on the value placed on dominance. If the decision to have
intercourse is consensual,2 0 8 a female who agrees has done so despite
the risk of pregnancy. The only way one can justify placing a burden
solely on males is if one assumes that females are in some sense coerced
by males. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, the male-only penalty is
premised on the judgment "that the decision to engage in the risk-cre-
ating conduct is always-or at least typically-a male decision."20 9
If males and females are equally responsible, or if females seduce
males, the penalty placed on males is unjustified.2 10
It is important to point out, however, that beliefs about differences
in sex roles not only affect behavior in mating practices, but also affect
the views of appropriate roles for males and females in the larger
society. A statute that assigns greater responsibility for sexual inter-
course to males than to females surely reinforces stereotypical thinking
about male and female roles. Males are seen as dominant and force-
ful, if somewhat irresponsible, while females are weak and submis-
sive. Such generalizations involve little more than prejudice, although
they unfortunately reflect traditional beliefs. Moreover, these general-
izations disadvantage members of both groups who do not fit or wish
to conform to the stereotype. 21 1
The statute also unfairly burdens males who are seduced.212 Fe-
males have the opportunity to reduce the risk of pregnancy to a point
where the fear of becoming pregnant provides little deterrence to
sexual activity.2 13 Moreover, there is some evidence that pregnancy
can even be an incentive for sexual activity.21 4 Males are likely to
resent being placed in unfair jeopardy for identical conduct or for
conduct instigated by a party freed from liability. By punishing only
208. By definition, statutory rape has always embodied the element of consent by
the female. Her consent, however, is not a defense because she is "conclusively
presumed to be incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of sexual
intercourse." Statutory Rape Laws, supra note 67, at 757.
209. 101 S. Ct. at 1220 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see Statutory Rape Laws, supra
note 67, at 772-73.
210. Statutory Rape Laws, supra note 67, at 772-73. It is a "basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing." Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
211. See D. MacNamara & E. Sagarin, Sex, Crime, and the Law 66-67 (1977);
Conlin, Equal Protection Versus Equal Rights Amendment- Where Are We Now?,
24 Drake L. Rev. 259, 308 (1975).
212. Statutory Rape Laws, supra note 67, at 769-77.
213. If the female uses birth control methods to decrease the risk of pregnancy, the
deterrents are no longer equal. In effect, Justice Rehnquist equated the deterrent
value of a speculative physical condition with a criminal penalty.
214. See Castleman, HEW and the 'Sexual Revolution': Why Teenagers Get
Pregnant, 225 Nation 549 (1977). A "frequently overlooked reason why teens allow
themselves to get pregnant is that they want children." Id. at 551.
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males, the statute generates a feeling of unfairness that, in turn,
ultimately harms women without providing them any real benefit.
The harm to females is subtle. The earlier discussion suggested
several factors that are likely to create a burden.2 15 Measured by
these criteria, the disadvantage to women becomes clear. The Califor-
nia statutory rape law is based on, and perpetuates, stereotypical
thinking about women,2 16 and limits the responsibility women are to
assume for their own actions. Moreover, "[c]ultural stereotypes of
male aggression and female passivity tend to be self-fulfilling prophe-
cies. The stereotype of females as victims is especially pervasive and
damaging. '2 1 7 Thus, Justice Rehnquist's analysis in Michael M. fails
to apply the correct standard of inquiry, because even under the
Stewart approach, stricter scrutiny is required when discrimination
on the basis of sex is demeaning.218
II. Rostker: A STANDARD MISAPPLIED
In Rostker v. Goldberg,219 the impropriety of Justice Stewart's mod-
ification of the intermediate scrutiny standard is manifest. The
Rostker Court ruled that equal protection requires only that a gender
classification reflect real differences between males and females. 220
Although this argument has been consistently invoked as a justifica-
tion for gender-based distinctions in the context of classifications that
have benefited women,221 the situation in Rostker is not such a benefi-
cial classification.
In Rostker, the Supreme Court was asked to decide the constitu-
tionality of the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) ,222 which em-
powered the President to require the registration of males, but not
females, for military service. 223  Initiated in 1971 by several men
215. These include classifications that place women at an economic disadvantage,
that are based on stereotypical thinking about women, that force men and women to
adhere to traditional roles or that restrict choice or responsibility. See supra notes
148-49 and accompanying text.
216. See Statutory Rape Laws, supra note 67, at 769 ("Furthermore, by presum-
ing that underage females, unlike underage males, are incapable of understanding
the nature and consequences of sexual intercourse, statutory rape laws embody a
stereotype of girls as intellectually deficient and incompetent in a way in which boys
are not.").
217. Id. at 770 (footnote omitted); see Karst, supra note 126, at 7-8.
218. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353-54 (1979).
219. 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
220. Id. at 2658-59.
221. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting);
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 354-55 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313,
317-18 (1977) (per curiam); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975); Kahn v.
Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1974).
222. 50 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 451-473 (West 1981).
223. 101 S. Ct. at 2648; 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 453 (West 1981).
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subject to its provisions, the lawsuit remained dormant for several
years because registration for the draft had been discontinued in
1975.24 With the reinstitution of registration by President Carter in
July, 1980, the issue was revived. The plaintiffs sought to have the
legislation declared invalid on the grounds that it violated their consti-
tutional right to equal protection. Although the initial plaintiffs were
males subject to the registration, women's groups recognized that the
right of women to equal protection was implicated and filed amicus
briefs in support of the plaintiffs. 225
The goal of the MSSA is to register a pool of individuals who can be
inducted into military service in the event of a national emer-
gency.226 The MSSA neither requires, nor permits, an), woman to be
registered.22 7 The constitutional issue presented by the male-only
registration requirement is whether the exclusion of all women vio-
lates the equal protection clause. The Rostker case does not raise the
issues of female eligibility for induction, the assignment of personnel
after induction, or the utilization of women in combat positions. Yet,
Justice Rehnquist's presentation of the questions for the Court dis-
torted the analysis and left the central issue unresolved.
For example, the Court's initial inquiry was whether Congress has
the power to raise and support armies.22 8 That power is indisput-
able.2 9 Justice Rehnquist then framed the issue as whether the Court
has the competence to assess the validity of military decisions concern-
ing the composition, training, equipping and controlling of the mili-
tary.230 The answer is obvious; it does not. If the issue were posed
instead as whether the Court can determine when such decisions
infringe on rights created by the Constitution, the answer is not so
clear. Although the Supreme Court cannot determine the number of
combat troops that might be needed, it can determine that a decision
to send only blacks into combat would be unconstitutional.
Another example of an analysis based on the wrong question is the
Court's discussion of whether military needs could be satisfied without
registering women.2 3' This might be true, but it is an irrelevant issue.
224. Id. at 2649-50. During the Vietnam era, numerous cases were instituted
attacking the gender distinctions in the draft laws. See, e.g., United States v. Reiser,
532 F.2d 673, 673 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 838 (1976); United States v.
Fallon, 407 F.2d 621, 622 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 908 (1969); United States
v. Dorris, 319 F. Supp. 1306, 1307 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
225. NOW Amicus Brief, supra note 120; Amicus Brief for Women's Equity
Action League Educational and Legal Defense Fund and 11 other women's groups,
Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
226. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 451(d) (West 1981).
227. Id. § 453.
228. 101 S. Ct. at 2651.
229. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
230. 101 S. Ct. at 2651-53.
231. Id. at 2657-60. But cf. Steele, Males Only Draft Registration: An Equal
Protection Analysis, 11 Cumb. L. Rev. 295, 306-09 (1980) (current data supporting
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"That it is not 'necessary' to include a group of individuals does not
prove that excluding the group is constitutionally justified. 232
Finally, the Court essentially premised its decision on the validity of
the policy that women should not go into combat. 233 Justice
Rehnquist's syllogism was that the purpose of registration is to estab-
lish a pool of potential nonvolunteer combat personnel; women are
not available for combat positions; therefore, women are not required
to register.2 34 Inductees chosen from the registration pool, however,
fill both noncombat and combat positions. 23 Registration serves to
assess the country's overall military strength. 23 A judicial decree on
the constitutionality of completely excluding women from draft regis-
tration did not require the Court to determine precisely how women
should be utilized in the military. Regardless of the validity or consti-
tutionality of excluding women from combat positions, the Court was
not required to address the issue. 237 The preclusion of women from
combat has been effectively achieved by direct legislative and military
regulations2 38 that were not in issue before the Court. These statutes
essentially render unnecessary any question of whether registration of
women would require their use in combat. The Court's syllogism is
therefore a meaningless argument.
In view of this distorted analysis, what the Court did not say in
Rostker may be more significant than what it did say. In contrast to its
extensive treatment of the issue of deference to Congress on questions
of military policy, the Court summarily dismissed the issue of the
the position that women are of great assistance to the country's military prepared-
ness); Note, Women and the Draft: The Constitutionality of All-Male Registration,
94 Harv. L. Rev. 406, 411-17 (1980) (same) [hereinafter cited as Women and the
Draft].
232. Women and the Draft, supra note 231, at 415.
233. 101 S. Ct. at 2656-59.
234. id.
235. Id. at 2671-72 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Steele, supra note 231, at 303-09.
236. The Army Chief of Staff said in Senate hearings, "women should be required
to register ... in order for us to have an inventory of what the available strength is
within the military qualified pool in this country." Senate Comm. on Armed Serv-
ices, Requiring Reinstitution of Registration for Certain Persons Under the Military
Selective Service Act, and for other Purposes, S. Rep. No. 226, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
14 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Senate Report]; see 101 S. Ct. at 2669 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
237. 101 S. Ct. at 2657-58. Whether women should engage in military combat
was not an issue before the Court. As the district court repeatedly emphasized below,
"[t]he issue before us is the constitutionality of the total exclusion of women from the
[registration], not the extent to which the military services must utilize women."
Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 596 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 2646
(1981). Initially, Justice Rehnquist also phrased the issue as whether requiring the
registration of males and not females was violative of equal protection. 101 S. Ct. at
2646. He then went on to consider the role of women in combat as the case's
dispositive issue.
238. 101 S. Ct. at 2657-58.
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requisite level of scrutiny.239  In fact, Justice Rehnquist failed to
delineate the equal protection test he was employing and suggested
that such questions merely confuse analysis: "We do not think that the
substantive guarantee of due process or certainty in the law will be
advanced by any further 'refinement' in the applicable tests as sug-
gested by the Government. ' 240  Significantly, the standard applied
resembles the reasonableness test.
Although Justice Rehnquist dealt summarily with the importance of
the standard of scrutiny for questions involving gender classifications,
the standard of review employed sets the acceptable level of justifica-
tion. There are profound differences between rational connections,
substantial connections and necessary connections. Dismissal of the
issue of the standard of scrutiny suggests that the Court has estab-
lished a single level of scrutiny for classifications other than race and
national origin. Assuming that all gender classifications are subject to
the same lower level of analysis would make all earlier gender-classifi-
cation decisions equally valid for comparison. This position, long
advocated by Justice Rehnquist,2 4 1 is simply inconsistent with past
precedent because there has been a distinction made according to the
burden imposed. Prior to Rostker, a majority of the Justices had
agreed that classifications disadvantageous to women required a
heavier burden of justification than advantageous ones,2 42 and justifi-
cations that sufficed for the latter were unacceptable when used else-
where.2 43 It is crucial that these distinctions be maintained.
However cursory the treatment of the appropriate standard of re-
view, the Court, by mentioning it, at least acknowledged that it is
important. The Court completely ignored the critical issue of burden.
Justice Rehnquist did not claim the classification was benign for
women. He did not discuss the question at all. Yet, one cannot under-
estimate or ignore the sociological impact of an official endorsement
by the highest legislative, military and judicial bodies of the inevita-
bility of sex roles. The non-registration of women supports sex-role
stereotyping and locks women into the status quo. As Justice Marshall
said in dissent, by the Rostker decision, "[t]he Court... place[d] its
imprimatur on one of the most potent remaining public expressions of
'ancient canards about the proper role of women.'" "244
239. Id. at 2654.
240. Id. Justice Rehnquist has been openly critical of the Brennan standard of
intermediate scrutiny. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 220-21 (1976) (Rehnquist, I.,
dissenting).
241. See Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 153-54 (1980) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 220-21 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
242. See supra pt. I(D).
243. Id.
244. 101 S. Ct. at 2662 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Phillips v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971)).
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Justice Rehnquist justified his analysis by emphasizing the Court's
duty to defer to Congress as a co-equal branch.2 45  In Rehnquist's
view, because Congress made a conscious classification, after long
debate about the propriety of registering women, the Court should
defer to deliberate congressional intention. 246  This reasoning is a
distortion of the argument that an inadvertant gender classification
carries a presumption of invalidity.2 47 It does not follow that Con-
gressional deliberation ensures a non-discriminatory result. For exam-
ple, the families of female workers taxed for social security would
have been just as unprotected if Congress had consciously debated the
issue as they were when Congress provided female workers with less
coverage inadvertently. 248  In another context, the Court has made
purposeful discrimination a key ingredient in determining that a law
is not constitutional. 249
Justice Rehnquist also argued that congressional power "to raise
and support armies" requires great deference because it is an enumer-
ated power exclusive to Congress. 2 0 Although the Court's deference
to Congress in military matters is strong, this still does not justify the
decision. While the protections of the Bill of Rights do not apply with
the same force to those in active military service, 5 1 the power of the
military is not unlimited. Deference to Congress regarding military
affairs flows not only from the constitutional grant of power, but also
from the perceived lack of judicial competence to evaluate defense
policy.25 2  Where the Court is able to decide constitutional issues
without infringing on issues of military policy, the need for deference
lessens.
Moreover, the Court has an obligation to evaluate the constitution-
ality of congressional decisions regarding the military.25 3 No branch
245. 101 S. Ct. at 265.1-52.
246. Id. at 2655-56.
247. See*Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 86-88 (1979); Califano v. Webster,
430 U.S. 313, 318-20 (1977) (per curiam); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207,
210-11 (1977).
248. See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 210-11 (1977).
249. Facially neutral laws are subjected to the traditional rationality test unless It
can be demonstrated that the legislature intended to discriminate. In the latter
circumstance, the much more stringent strict scrutiny test is applied. Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976).
250. 101 S. Ct. at 2651-52.
251. B. Schwartz, supra note 25, § 5.17, at 194-96.
252. 101 S. Ct. at 2652; Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 5, 6 (1973).
253. "The war power of the United States, like its other powers. . . , is subject to
applicable constitutional limitations." Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Ware-
house Co., 251 U.S. 146, 156 (1919); see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
225 (1944) (Frankfurter, I., concurring). Justice Rehnquist, however, deferred to
Congress without analyzing the statute in Rostker, stating that "[i]t is not for this
Court to dismiss such problems as insignificant in the context of military prepared-
ness and the exigencies of a future mobilization." 101 S. Ct. at 2660. In the past, the
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of government can hold itself above the Constitution.'s As the Su-
preme Court warned during the Vietnam war, "the phrase 'war
power' cannot be invoked as a talismanic incantation to support any
exercise of congressional power which can be brought within its am-
bit. '[E]ven the war power does not remove constitutional limitations
safeguarding essential liberties.' ",255 The Supreme Court and lower
federal courts have consequently reviewed a broad array of military
policies, including the reach of military jurisdiction, -56 the military's
right to encroach on civilian life,2 5 the allocation of military bene-
fits,258 in-service conscientious objector claims, 9 the exclusion of
women from Navy ships 260 and promotion policies within the Navy.2 10
Thus, Justice Rehnquist's mere assertion that "[c]ongressional judg-
ments concerning registration and the draft are based on judgments
concerning military operations and needs"2 62 should not shield these
Court has not been so eager to accept the government's evaluative assertions regard-
ing gender-based legislation. "This Court need not in equal protection cases accept at
face value assertions of legislative purposes, when an examination of the legislative
scheme and its history demonstrates that the asserted purpose could not have been a
goal of the legislation." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1975).
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Rostker, stated "that even in the area of military
affairs, deference to congressional judgments cannot be allowed to shade into an
abdication of this Court's ultimate responsibility to decide constitutional questions."
101 S. Ct. at 2663-64.
254. "The respective spheres of action of military authorities and of judges are of
course very different. But within their sphere, military authorities are no more
outside the bounds of obedience to the Constitution than are judges within theirs."
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 225 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
255. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1967) (quoting Home Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934)).
256. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (crime must be service connected
to be under military jurisdiction); McElroy v. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960)
(civilian employee of military overseas cannot be tried by court-martial in peacetime
for a noncapital offense); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234
(1960) (dependent wife of soldier overseas could not be tried by court-martial for
capital offense); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (dependent civilians accompany-
ing soldiers overseas could not be tried by court-martial for capital offense).
257. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1957) (the military does not have
jurisdiction over the wives of servicemen who accompany them abroad); United
States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21-23 (1955) (only persons presently in the
military are subject to court martial); see also O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,
272-73 (1969) (crime must be service connected); Kinsella v. United States ex rel.
Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 248-49 (1960) (no jurisdiction over civilian dependent for
noneapital offense).
258. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973).
259. E.g., United States ex rel. Sheldon v. O'Malley, 420 F.2d 1344 (D.C. Cir.
1969); United States ex rel. Brooks v. Clifford, 409 F.2d 700 (4th Cir. 1969).
260. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291 (D.D.C. 1978).
261. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
262. 101 S. Ct. at 2653.
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judgments from constitutional scrutiny. Moreover, the Rostker case
does not involve the Court in a decision regarding military policy. It
merely involves the pool of personnel from which assignments are to
be made. One wonders whether the Court would defer to the judg-
ment of Congress if it chose to re-segregate the Armed Forces alleging
that racial harmony contributed to combat readiness.26 3
A. The Rostker Court Fails to Comply with the
Requirements of Intermediate Scrutiny
While Justice Rehnquist said, "[w]e of course do not abdicate our
ultimate responsibility to decide the constitutional question, but sim-
ply recognize that the Constitution itself requires such deference to
congressional choice,"' 26 4 he did abandon his judicial responsibility by
applying only a rational relationship test to the equal protection issue
at hand. Although Justice Rehnquist implies that he was using the
Craig v. Boren standard of intermediate scrutiny, 2 5 in fact he did not.
The legislative history of the MSSA reveals that Congress intended
to achieve five specific objectives by excluding women from registra-
tion: Preventing female participation in combat, avoiding the unnec-
essary registration of women, enhancing military flexibility, preclud-
ing the division of the military into two separate groups and assuring
that the draft is administratively convenient.2 61 If Justice Rehnquist
had applied the intermediate scrutiny standard, he would have evalu-
ated the importance of these objectives as government interests and
would have required a showing that the non-registration of women
bears a substantial relationship to the achievement of those goals.
Instead, Rehnquist emphasized that the exemption of women from
registration reflects the fact that men and women are "not similarly
situated for purposes of the draft or registration for a draft ' 20 7 because
women are ineligible for combat positions. Yet, after making combat
qualification a critical part of his argument, Justice Rehnquist did not
scrutinize the proposition that women are not fit for combat. The
justification was merely that the majority of Americans support it and
Congress supports it. 268 The evidence presented then does not satisfy
anything but a loose rationality test, one that requires only a showing
of a possible connection between a classification and a government
end.269
263. See Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 415 (1857).
264. 101 S. Ct. at 2653.
265. Id. at 2654.
266. 1979 Senate Report, supra note 236, at 8-9.
267. 101 S. Ct. at 2658.
268. Id. at 2657-58.
269. See supra notes 39-43 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 50404
SEX DISCRIMINATION
Even if the combat restriction is acceptable, the draft restriction is
still not closely related to the important goal of having a pool of
potential combat troops available.27 0  There are many noncombat
positions within the armed services. If women are allowed to fill
these, more men will be available for combat, and military flexibility
will be enhanced. Troops need not be interchangeable as regards
combat ability. If this were so, the services under present policy could
not use any women. If women registered, the pool of eligible combat
troops would thus be enlarged, as would the pool of eligible noncom-
batants, upgrading the overall quality of the draftees.2 7 1 Separate
noncombat and combat positions are not novel to the military. Law-
yers accepted into the Judge Advocate's corps do not fight, and there
has long been a separate medical draft. While doctors are sent to
hostile zones, they do not directly engage in combat. Moreover, fe-
male nurses have not been excluded from such zones. In short, even if
one accepts arguendo that the combat restriction on women is valid,
there was no showing that exclusion of women from registration
enhances combat capabilities. As Justice White said,
on the record before us, the number of women who could be used
in the military without sacrificing combat-readiness is not at all
small or insubstantial, and administrative convenience has not
been sufficient justification for the kind of outright gender-based
discrimination involved in registering and conscripting men but no
women at all. 2 72
The application of minimal scrutiny in Rostker was thus inconsistent
with the doctrine established by the Court during the past decade.
B. The Rostker Decision Burdens Women
The gender-based action in Rostker cannot plausibly be considered
non-burdensome. While it is true that service in the Armed Forces is a
responsibility many try to avoid, it does not follow that the classifica-
tion is therefore benign for women. Military service is a particularly
public form of employment, and the gender classification established
by Congress has the potential to powerfully reinforce traditional sex-
roles in all other endeavors.
First, the refusal to draft women is based in part on the belief that
women lack the capability to go into combat. -73 The generalizations
upon which the exclusion of women are based are precisely the type
270. See Women and the Draft, supra note 231, at 413-15.
271. See id. at 415-16 (use of women in the military would enhance military
flexibility).
272. 101 S. Ct. at 2662 (White, J., dissenting).
273. See Steele, supra note 225, at 303-06.
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that are likely to perpetuate inequality. 274 Women are viewed as too
weak, insufficiently brave, and too emotionally volatile. These nega-
tive generalizations ignore the fact that women are clearly qualified
for a full range of noncombat positions.275 Yet, the decision to regis-
ter all males, regardless of mental, emotional and physical health, and
to register no females, regardless of ability to serve, clearly stigmatizes
women as different and, ultimately, as inferior in the military con-
text. This label of inferiority inevitably influences the perception of
women throughout society. Similar generalizations about the capabil-
ities of women have excluded them from many professions in the
past.2 76  The stereotype that women lack the physical and mental
capacity to be effective combat soldiers has resulted not only in Con-
gress' refusal to register women but has served as the basis for offering
female volunteers different opportunities within the service. 77 Courts
have acknowledged such differential treatment in earlier cases.2 78
Notwithstanding the prevalent attitudes, the experience with
women who serve in noncombat positions has generally been posi-
tive.2 79 They have been of benefit to the military and have in turn
benefited by their service. The lack of opportunity for advancement,
and the current negative attitude manifested by the decision not to
register women, however, have no doubt encouraged women to seek
alternative careers. 280 This is a particularly invidious discrimination
because the military is a significant source of vocational training from
which women are effectively excluded .2 8  This in turn results in
fewer job opportunities in civilian life. More directly, many benefits,
such as mortgage money at lower rates and preference in government
274. Many of the same reasons were offered to support discrimination against
blacks in the Armed Forces up to and including World War II. Nat'l NOW Times,
May, 1981, at 1, col. 3, at 6, col. 1.
275. Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2670-72 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); Steele, supra note 231, at 304-09.
276. Legislation that is the by-product of "traditional way[s] of thinking about
females" has been condemned by the Court. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223
(1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
277. See M. Binkin & S. Bach, Women and the Military 4-21 (1977); Note, The
Equal Rights Amendment and the Military, 82 Yale L.J. 1533, 1547-54 (1973).
278. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975); Owens v. Brown, 455 F.
Supp. 291, 294-95 (D.D.C. 1978).
279. See Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 600-05 (E.D. Pa. 1980), rev'd,
101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981); Steele, supra note 225, at 305-09; Women and the Draft,
supra note 225, at 411-13.
280. The Army's Chief of Staff indicated in Senate hearings that the Army was
experiencing a 25 % shortage of female volunteers. Reinstitution of Procedures for
Registration Under the Military Selective Service Act: Hearings on S. 109 and S. 226
Before the Subcomm. on Manpower and Personnel of the Senate Comm. on Armed
Services, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1979) (testimony of General Bernard W. Rogers).
281. NOW Amicus brief, supra note 120, at 27.
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employment, are tied to former military service.2 2 Just two years
ago, the Supreme Court upheld Massachusetts' Veterans Preference
Act.2 83  No gender classification was recognized. In view of that
decision, it is clear that the classification creating different treatment
with respect to the draft inflicts a burden on women.
Permitting women to volunteer, and alleging that there is no need
to register women because female volunteers can fill requirements, is
an insufficient argument and response to the problem.2' Because a
major purpose of registration is to protect against the unanticipated
shortage of volunteers, non-registration cannot be justified by conjec-
ture about the anticipated availability of volunteers. Additionally, as
volunteers, women are still an exception in the military, a highly
visible, token minority. Women volunteers are stigmatized as doing
something unusual for a female. If all women were required to regis-
ter, their presence would merely be representative of their responsibil-
ity as citizens. That the ability to volunteer is open to women does not
cure the constitutional defect of their non-registration.
Finally, and most importantly, the Rostker decision deprives
women of one of the hallmarks of citizenship, equal responsibility for
national defense. 285 By allowing all males but no females to register,
Congress and the Supreme Court tell all women that they will not be
called upon to serve and defend their country, solely because of their
gender. Because the allocation of legal rights is directly related to the
allocation of responsibilities, men and women will not be equal until
they share equally both the rights and obligations of citizenship.2 0
Psychologically, the denial of responsibilities provides justification
for those who would discriminate in the allocation of benefits. Advo-
282. For a review of benefits tied to former military service, see Goodman,
Women, War and Equality: An Examination of Sex Discrimination in the Military, 5
Women's Rts. L. Rep. 243, 245 n.19 (1979), and statutes cited therein.
283. Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
284. NOW Amicus brief, supra note 120, at 25-28.
285. Service in the military is "one of the highest duties of the citizen." Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 415 (1857); accord Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
112 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring) (" 'ultimate duty of American citizenship' ").
286. In the Dred Scott case, the Court posed the question, "why are the African
race, born in the State, not permitted to [serve in the military]. The answer is
obvious; [they are] not, by the institutions and laws of the State, numbered among its
people. [They form] no part of the sovereignty of the State, and [are] not therefore
called on to uphold and defend it." Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 415
(1857). Women are accorded the same sort of second-class citizenship by the MSSA.
In addition, it is true that stereotypes concerning women's weaknesses affect both
men's perceptions of and behavior toward women and women's own self-perceptions
and reactions. B. Brown, A. Freedman, H. Katz & A. Price, Women's Rights and the
Law 12 (1977); L. Kanowitz, Women and the Law 198-99 (1969); Karst, supra note
126, at 7-8.
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cates of the Equal Rights Amendment have often been confronted
with, "let me hear about equal rights when you have equal responsi-
bilities . . . [and] when you serve as we [men] do."' 28 7 While the
MSSA proclaims that the "obligations and privileges of serving [are to]
be shared generally, in accordance with a system of selection which is
fair and just,"2s8 the statute's exclusion of women is itself a statement
that the denial of women's participation in society, solely because of
gender, is "fair and just." This is a proposition that must not be
permitted to stand. The Supreme Court has recognized that
[i]mplicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of defending
those values and ideals that set this Nation apart. For almost two
centuries, our country has taken singular pride in the democratic
ideals enshrined in its Constitution .... It would indeed be ironic
if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the subver-
sion of one of those liberties . . . which makes the defense of the
Nation worthwhile.2 89
It is indeed ironic that the democratic principle of equal rights has
been subverted by the Supreme Court in the name of deference to
congressional military decisions.
It is too soon to know whether Rostker is a turning point in the
Court's treatment of gender classifications. It is not clear whether the
promise of equal protection for women has been compromised or
whether Rostker is an aberration that can be explained by the military
context within which it occured. The hope remains that the Court
will confine its willingness to uphold gender discrimination to military
matters. Clearly, however, the Court has departed from prevailing
practice by requiring a showing of mere rationality in the face of a
disadvantageous classification. 90
III. BEYOND Michael M. AND Rostker
Before one can assess the implications of Michael M. and Rostker, it
is necessary to examine the Court's treatment of the sex-based classifi-
cation in Kirchberg v. Feenstra.2 91 Harold Feenstra, charged by his
wife with molesting their minor daughter, had secured the legal
services of Karl Kirchberg by promising to mortgage the home he and
his wife jointly owned, without informing her of the agreement.
Lousiana law provided that a husband had the unilateral right to
287. Nat'l NOW Times, May, 1981, at 1, col. 3, at 2, col. 3.
288. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 451(c) (West 1981).
289. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
290. This was the first time since 1971 that such a classification had been upheld
in a full opinion. But cf. Vorcheimer v. School Dist., 430 U.S. 703 (1977) (gender-
classification upheld in a per curiam opinion).
291. 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981).
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dispose of community property unless his wife had taken action to
declare an objection.2 92 Mrs. Feenstra challenged the constitutional-
ity of this law, and the Court unanimously found in her favor. Invok-
ing the intermediate scrutiny standard, Justice Marshall said that
gender classifications were barred unless there was a showing that
"the classification is tailored to further an important governmental
interest. '2 93 Ultimately, there was no need to assess the justification
for the classification because no important interest was offered. In
addition, the Court specifically stated that it would not infer a viable
legislative purpose to support the statute.29 4
Moreover, doubt existed as to whether there was even any rational
basis for the classification. The only support advanced for the statute's
constitutionality was that Mrs. Feenstra could have taken steps to
avoid the impact of the provision.29 5 The existence of a remedy,
however, does not negate discrimination. The Court has long recog-
nized that affirmative requirements can provide barriers to the exer-
cise of rights as effectively as can a direct denial of those rights.2 6
In spite of the Kirchberg decision, the Court's opinions this term
may signal a general retreat from attention to laws that discriminate
on the basis of sex but are not clearly arbitrary. If the standard of
review employed in Rostker and Michael M. is extended elsewhere,
the future looks bleak for equal rights advocates. The level of scrutiny
in both was much lower than that accorded other burdensome classifi-
cations. If the Court persists in the position that sex is a valid basis for
discrimination as long as it is consciously employed and is not entirely
unrelated to differences between the sexes, discrimination will pre-
vail.
It is beyond dispute that men and women are not identical with
respect to past history and physical characteristics, and that they may
also face different working conditions, positions in the economy and
assigned roles. Many of these differences, however, are the result of
past discrimination. If such factors serve as a basis for future distinc-
tions, sex discrimination will be perpetuated. While it is true that the
standard applied in Michael M. and Rostker will invalidate laws that
are completely arbitrary, the standard provides women with little
more in the way of protection from discrimination than they were
accorded prior to 1971.
292. Id. at 1199.
293. Id. at 1198.
294. Id. at 1198 n.7.
295. Id. at 1199.
296. Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. '109, 716-18 (1974) (requirement that political
candidate pay a filing fee to get on a ballot denies equal protection to indigent
candidates); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 352 (1972) (one year residence
requirement to vote unconstitutional); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15,
395 U.S. 621, 622 (1969) (requirement of property ownership to vote unconstitu-
tional).
1981]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
There are several possible explanations, however, for the Court's
holdings in Michael M. and Rostker. Michael M. may indicate that
the Court lacks adequate criteria for judging discrimination against
women. Rostker may indicate that the Court made a political judg-
ment to avoid confrontation with Congress on the question of military
policy. These explanations are probably accurate because case prece-
dent indicates that a retreat from heightened scrutiny is unlikely.
There has been consistently strong majority support for both the
application of intermediate scrutiny and the invalidation of sex-based
actions that, in the Court's view, disadvantage women. 29 7 This con-
sensus disappears when there are Justices who characterize the action
as neutral or beneficial to women.298
From 1971 to 1981, the Court invalidated on equal protection
grounds eleven statutes that employed gender classifications.2 9 The
number of gender-based classifications disallowed increases to thir-
teen, if Taylor v. Louisiana10 and Duren v. Missouri301 are included,
decisions closely akin to the equal protection cases although the stat-
utes were invalidated on due process grounds.
A survey of the opinions in these thirteen cases indicates that all of
the Justices, even those reluctant to state that the Court was going
beyond traditional rational relationship analysis, have agreed that
some sex-based legislation violates equal protection. Four of these
decisions were unanimous, 302 five had only one dissent, 303 one was
297. See, e.g., Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 83-89 (1979); Stanton v. Stan-
ton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975).
298. Compare Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (there was disagreement
over the effect of the classification and the Justices split in their decision 4-1-4) vith
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (per curiam) (the statute benefited women
and the Justices exhibited a consensus).
299. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981); Wengler v. Mut. Druggists
Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76 (1979); Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v.
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Stanton v.
Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Fron-
tiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
300. 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
301. 439 U.S. 357 (1979). In Taylor and Duren, the Court invalidated exemptions
of women from jury duty on the grounds that such exemptions were contrary to the
fair cross section requirement of the sixth amendment. The Court's focus on the
defendant's due process rights should not mask the fact that explicit gender classifica-
tions were involved.
302. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981); Califano v. Westcott, 443
U.S. 76 (1979); Wienberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971).
303. Wengler v. Mut. Druggists Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Taylor v. Louisi-
ana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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seven-two, 30 4 one was six-three, 305 and two produced a five-four
split.306 Significantly, in the nine cases in which the result was sup-
ported by at least eight Justices, there was general agreement that
women were the burdened group. By contrast, in cases in which some
of the Justices believed that the regulations had no detrimental effect
on women, there were wide divisions in the Court. For example, there
were seven opinions expressed in Craig v. Boren. 7 The Court split
four-one-four in Califano v. Goldfarb,30 8 a case in which one of the
questions at issue was the effect of the classification. Three opinions
were submitted in Orr v. Orr,309 making the real division five-one-
three. Thus, it seems unlikely that Rostker represents a complete
reversal in light of this line of precedent and the judicial support for
the intermediate scrutiny standard.
More probably, two related considerations influenced the Court in
Rostker. First, this Court has taken an increasingly restrictive view of
its role in the political system, deferring to the decisions of Congress,
the President and the states where possible. 310  This self-imposed
judicial restraint has resulted in an unusual amount of issue avoidance
during the 1980 term.3 1' The emphasis on deference to Congress in
Rostker reflects a view that has been expressed in other cases both in
and outside the area of national security. 312  This is, of course, an
304. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 215, 217 (1976) (dissenting were justices
Burger and Rehnquist).
305. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 285, 290 (1979) (dissenting were justices Burger,
Powell and Rehnquist).
306. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (dissenting were Justices Stewart,
Burger, Rehnquist and Stevens); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (dissent-
ing were Justices Burger, Blackmun, Stewart and Rehnquist).
307. 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (Brennan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court; concur-
ring were Justices Powell and Stevens; Justice Stewart concurred in the judgment and
Justice Blackmun concurred in part; dissenting were Justices Burger and
Rehnquist).
308. 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (Justice Stevens concurred; dissenting were Justices
Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist).
309. 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (concurring were Justices Blackmun and Stevens; dis-
senting were Justices Burger, Powell and Rehnquist).
310. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2991-92 (1981); Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclam. Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 2352, 2360 (1981); Western &
S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 101 S. Ct. 2070, 2084 (1981); Northwest
Airlines v. Transport Workers Union, 101 S. Ct. 1571, 1581-82 (1981).
311. See, e.g., Kissinger v. Halperin, 101 S. Ct. 3132 (1981) (dismissed in part and
returned to lower court in part for further consideration as to whether the President
may be sued for damages for violating constitutional rights while within the scope of
his official duties); University of Texas v. Camenisch, 101 S. Ct. 1830 (1981) (re-
manded to determine whether the Rehabilitation Act requires that a university pay
for a sign language interpreter for a deaf student).
312. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 101 S. Ct. 2972, 2986-88 (1981). There have
also been a series of decisions upholding the actions of regulatory agencies. See, e.g.,
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981); FCC v.
WNCN Listener's Guild, 101 S. Ct. 1266 (1981); Steadman v. SEC, 101 S. Ct. 999
(1981); EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 101 S. Ct. 295 (1980).
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approach to constitutional interpretation that has a long history.a"'
The view that the Court lacks competence to form a coherent policy is
one of the reasons often offered in support of this position.1 4 The
deference argument, therefore, cannot be dismissed as a mere subter-
fuge masking a policy judgment.
Secondly, the Court's perception that it must show restraint is
bolstered by the belief that the Court is politically vulnerable. 35 It is
conceivable that a majority of the Justices did not question the exclu-
sion of women from combat. In light of this, they probably saw no
reason to engage in a confrontation with Congress over what may
have appeared to be the trivial issue of registration, which, if invali-
dated, would result in attention to larger questions. This is admittedly
speculative, but it is well known that clashes between the Court and
Congress have in the past led to retreats on the part of the Court.310
From the same perspective, however, there is little reason for the
Court to retreat further on the question of explicit gender-based classi-
fications. Support for the equal treatment of males and females on
most questions is in fact quite strong. The most recent polls indicate
that support for women's equality has increased. "From the early to
the late 1970's, the number of people who supported women's libera-
tion grew from 49% to 60% -from less than majority to majority
proportions. ' 317 The Equal Rights Amendment is widely supported,
although it is unlikely to be ratified, given a strong, organized opposi-
tion. The Court must continue to apply a stringent review to sex-
based classifications and can do so without incurring popular or con-
gressional opposition.
The time is ripe for a reevaluation of the Court's approach to
explicit gender-based classifications. First, there is little basis for af-
fording women less protection than racial minorities are given under
the equal protection clause. Most of the factors relevant in according
racial minorities special protection apply equally.when women are the
focus of state action. In fact, many of the same justifications for
313. See, e.g., CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973);
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
314. C. Ducat, Modes of Constitutional Interpretation 135 (1978); D. Horowitz,
The Courts and Social Policy 18 (1977).
315. Taylor, Attorney General Outlines Campaign to Rein in Courts, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 30, 1981, at 1, col. 1 (Attorney General accused courts of "intrusions upon the
legislative domain" and announced that the Administration would seek greater judi-
cial restraint).
316. R. Funston, A Vital National Seminar 214 (1978); A. Mason & W. Beaney,
The Supreme Court in a Free Society 185 (2d ed. 1968); A. Miller, The Supreme
Court, Myth and Reality 45 (1978); S. Nagel, The Legal Process From a Behavioral
Perspective 260-79 (1969).
317. D. Barron & D. Yankelovich, Today's American Woman: How the Public
Sees Her 2 (Sept. 1980) (report by the Public Agenda Foundation, New York, N.Y.,
prepared for the President's Advisory Comm. for Women).
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varying the review of racial classifications apply equally when gender
is used to classify people. There are some sound reasons for making sex
a suspect classification. 31 8  Vacillation by the Court would be
avoided. Such a rule would create an absolute principle, limiting
Court activism. There would be no danger of perpetuating stereo-
types. Such a rule, however, would be an inadequate response to the
problem of gender equality. First, against a background of past dis-
crimination, gender blindness would make the achievement of equal-
ity far more difficult. It would limit efforts designed to redress past
discrimination and to facilitate women's assumption of new social
roles. 3
19
Second, when the danger of burden is joined to the immutability of
gender, the need to assess carefully all gender classifications becomes
apparent. As a result, strict scrutiny should govern hostile classifica-
tions, intermediate scrutiny should govern those that prefer women
and traditional scrutiny should govern those that have a neutral im-
pact.3 20 Thus, the first task of the Court would be to assess burden. If
the burden is found to fall on women, the strict scrutiny standard
should prevail. Such a classification should be allowed only if there is
a compelling state interest and if the law is narrowly tailored to the
achievement of that interest. In those situations in which women are
benefited, the scrutiny should turn on the degree of burden to men. If
the government action involves a distribution of scarce resources, the
Court should apply the intermediate standard as formulated by Jus-
tice Brennan. As the government action moves away from allocating a
scarce resource, the degree of judicial scrutiny should diminish.32 '
Whenever a burden is placed on men which is unrelated to an attempt
to redress women for past disadvantages, intermediate scrutiny is
appropriate. For example, such scrutiny should be applied when the
state distinguishes between natural mothers and fathers of children
born out of wedlock. Only if there is a determination that the gender
classification is harmless should minimum scrutiny apply.
CONCLUSION
The adoption of the approach suggested in this Article to sex dis-
crimination will not resolve all issues raised by the recent cases. Al-
though Michael M. and Rostker might have been harder to defend
under a stricter standard, the Rostker Court might still have elected to
318. Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, supra note 117, at 888-909.
319. Gertner, supra note 8, at 214 (courts should test the benignness of a classifica-
tion by looking at its ability to facilitate new roles).
320. See Baer, supra note 6, at 489-91.
321. See Griswold, The Bakke Problem-Allocation of Scarce Resources in Educa-
tion and Other Areas, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 55 (a discussion of the problems of
preferential treatment in the context of the allocation of scarce resources).
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defer to Congress in military matters. More fundamentally, the focus
of this Article has been limited to the Court's treatment of classifica-
tions that directly distinguish between males and females. Women's
rights involve much more than explicit gender classifications. Even
beyond the question of abortion, many other issues, involving tax,
welfare and public service statutes, affect the position of women.
If sex is to become irrelevant to one's role in society, major social
changes need to occur. Many of these depend on alterations in affirm-
ative laws. The Court cannot, consistent with its role in a democratic
polity, force the government to adopt policies that will end discrimi-
nation. The Court can, and should, however, guard against govern-
mental actions that unfairly discriminate. The Court has recognized
that it stands "oath-bound to defend the Constitution ... bearing in
mind both the broad scope of legislative discretion and the ultimate
responsibility of constitutional adjudication." 322 The Court has fur-
ther acknowledged that "[t]he provisions of the Constitution are not
time-worn adages or hollow shibboleths. They are vital, living princi-
ples that authorize and limit governmental powers .... "1323 Consist-
ent with the living principles of the Constitution, the Court must
recognize the emerging equality of women in this country and, in
response to this reality, evaluate governmental actions by a standard
that fosters equal protection under the Constitution.
322. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 103-04 (1958).
323. Id. at 103.
